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PHILOSOPHICAL MOORINGS

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As with the rest of human life, morality and moral education have an outside and an inside. Seen from the outside, morality provides a way of getting along with others, and from the inside it is a way of getting along with oneself. In other words, moral education is at once a necessary condition for social control and an indispensable means of self-realization. Most of us, including philosophers and psychologists as well as parents and educators, assume that these two functions of morality sustain each other: what is good for society is good for our kids, and vice versa. Although Nietzsche and a few other so-called rugged individualists have rejected this assumption I will not spend time defending it in this chapter. Instead I will focus on the second of these two perspectives, the "inside view."[1] My motives for doing this are twofold. First of all, I want to unpack the general understanding, shared by contemporary educators of all persuasions, that morality is a form of self-realization. Also, I want to situate this understanding within the philosophical tradition of what, using the term in its broadest possible sense, I will simply call "human development."

Specialists in the fields of education and psychology may object that not all conceptions of moral education are developmental, and that is certainly true if we understand development in the biological sense of an organic unfolding of innate powers, taking place within a reasonably stable environment that sustains but does not itself shape the developmental process. It is also true if we understand development in a nonbiological but equally narrow sense as an ordered progress through cognitive stages, each of which has its own logical structure.[2] But our everyday concept of human development is not so narrow: there what is distinctive is not its inevitability or logical structure, but its normativity. Plainly put, most of us think of development as a movement from a less desirable state to a better one, even though in the case of human development the "betterness" at issue—namely, human flourishing—is subject to philosophical debate.

In what follows I will trace the way philosophers have formulated the fundamental developmental idea of human flourishing, since I believe that the history of their

struggles to understand what it means to be human have shaped the ways in which contemporary moral educators understand their own enterprise. I am tempted to say that here as elsewhere in the history of ideas, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. However, to say this would oversimplify the way theories emerge within an intellectual tradition. It would be more realistic, I believe, to think of traditions, including our philosophical tradition, as providing necessary albeit usually unnoticed moorings for a specific theory or practice such as character education or moral judgment development. Thanks to these moorings a theory or practice is secured, stabilized, and thereby rendered intellectually plausible and practically useful. This point applies across the board, but as we will see in the following pages it is especially true for the theory, research, and practice of moral and character education.

When I spoke just now of "our philosophical tradition" I had in mind the usual pantheon of Western philosophers, beginning of course with the Greeks. One could begin even further back, since ancient non-Western thought is rich with insights into the moral dimension of selfhood—or better, the liberation from the demands of the self. However, the non-Western part of our story is well covered in the next chapter, so let's begin with what might be called the early Greek cognitive-developmental conception of human development.

SOCRATES AND PLATO

For Socrates (469–399 BCE) and Plato (428–347 BCE),[3] human development consisted in increasingly adequate knowledge of the ideal forms and, at the highest level, knowledge of the form of the Good. This form or idea (the usual two translations of the Greek *eidos*) is supremely intelligible, and other forms "participate" in its goodness because they too are thoroughly intelligible albeit more limited in their referential range. Since even sensible things and images participate in the intelligibility of their respective forms (the tire on my car can be understood as representing, imperfectly, the idea of a perfect circle), they too have a derivative sort of goodness. Furthermore, something of the same sort also holds for the cognitions directed toward these forms and things: perceptual knowledge is good but intellectual knowledge is better. The movement from less to more adequate modes of thinking is represented in Plato's famous Allegory of the Cave (more on this in a moment).

Although the Good was the highest in a hierarchy of ideal forms, it could be known indirectly in the course of knowing lower forms that reflect its goodness—indeed, one can get a glimmer of the highest form from the most banal perceptual experience. This idea is not as arcane or counterintuitive as it might first seem. We use lofty ceremonial language to commend saints and heroes for their goodness, but we also smack our lips after eating a hot dog and say, quite unceremoniously, "Mmm, that was good!" Banalities such as the hot dog commendation have been the subject of language-analytic theorizing by metaethical philosophers since G. E. Moore, but they also illustrate something very important in Plato's theory of the forms. In our lived experience the theoretical distinction between knowing and willing disappears. In ordinary, nonproblematic circumstances—say on a perfect day at the stadium when the home team is winning and lunch was a very long time ago—to see or smell a hot dog cooking on the grill is by that very fact to want it. In other words, the hot dog is *perceived as desirable* or, as Plato would say, it is apprehended "under the form of the Good."

This account also applies to more lofty forms of cognition. Christian philosophers and theologians influenced by Plato have hypothesized that the beatific vision enjoyed by the saints in heaven is at once a face-to-face knowledge of God and a perfect loving union with him. And theorists of human development have said the same thing about knowledge of the Good qua *moral*, namely that it is the ideal form of Justice: to know it is to choose it. Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg are examples of this sort of moral cognitivism.[4] The philosopher William Frankena is another. In his classical article on metaethical internalism, he argued that the very locution "X is the good [or right] thing to do" entails a motivational claim on the part of the speaker that he or she is at least somewhat inclined to do X" (Frankena, 1958; see also Wren, 1991).

But neither contemporary cognitivists nor ancient Platonists ever thought that it is easy to attain a direct, internally motivating vision of the Good itself. Piaget and Kohlberg postulated a series of logically structured stages through which one must pass on the way to the complete fusion of moral knowledge and moral virtue. Plato, on the other hand, simply told a story, his famous Allegory of the Cave. In it he describes a group of prisoners who have been chained together since birth and can only see shadows on the wall in front of them, cast by a fire behind them against crude two-dimensional replicas of things in the outside world, which of course the prisoners have never seen nor even imagined to exist. One of the prisoners is dragged outside the cave where, after becoming accustomed to the bright light of the real world, he attains true knowledge or what we might call the higher stages of Platonic cognitive development. He sees for the first time and with increasing acuity the really real things (here read: eternal truths and values) that were so poorly imaged in the cave. Eventually he also sees the Sun itself, which like the Good, is the source of all things. The story does not have a happy ending, though. He later returns to the cave, where he is reviled by the prisoners for his inability to predict the goings and comings of the shadows on the wall. As often happens with those who try to enlighten others, he is eventually killed.

The beauty of virtue. Plato's most famous account of virtue is his discussion of justice in the *Republic*, where he compares the tripartite structure of the soul (mind, spirit, and appetite) to the three classes of an ideal society (rulers, guardians, and workers). Each of these three classes has a distinctive function—ruling, protecting, and producing or consuming goods—which when done well exhibits the virtues of wisdom, courage, and temperance respectively. A just society is one in which all three classes work well and harmoniously together. Similarly, an individual who is wise, courageous, and temperate is said to be just in a global sense that corresponds to what we mean today by calling someone a very righteous or moral person.

So far so good. But here as in Plato's other dialogical writings, it is important to recognize what precipitated his famous parallel of personal and societal justice. Much earlier in the dialogue Socrates had been shocked by the cynical claim, represented by the sophist Thrasymachus, that justice is nothing more than an instrument of self-interest. In opposition, Socrates argued that justice (and by extension, virtue in general) is not a means but rather a good in itself, a "thing of beauty" (*to kalon*). But what does this mean? Is Plato grounding his moral theory in purely aesthetic value? Not at all.

Although he expounded his comparison of a just person and a just society without going into detail about any of the constitutive virtues, it is clear from this and other parts of the *Republic* that he believed each virtue has its own status as an ideal Form or eternal truth, and hence can be known directly in roughly the same way as are the other Forms

or eternal truths, such as the one embodied in the tire of my car. In the latter case the eternal truth is the mathematical formula for a circle ($c = \pi d$); in the former (the moral judgment) it is a moral principle. Supposedly those who are truly wise understand the hurly burly of daily life in these terms, which in the moral context means that our judgments about what to do are based "on principle" in a double sense: the principle provides a motivational component as described above and also a justificatory rationale. Understood in this way, Plato's teaching on the virtues fits with the rule-oriented moral theory of Immanuel Kant and his contemporary heirs—who include not only philosophers like John Rawls but also cognitive developments such as Piaget and Kohlberg—as well as with the disposition-oriented theory of Aristotle and his heirs—who include not only philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre but also most of the character educationists featured elsewhere in this volume.

ARISTOTLE

After Socrates' death in 399 BCE, Plato taught in the academy until he died, during which time Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was a student and then, after Plato's death, the founder of a rival school, the Lyceum. The institutional rivalry between these two schools is of little historical interest, but the intellectual rivalry between Aristotle and those of Plato's disciples who remained true to their teacher's intellectual idealism is important. The contrast is supposedly illustrated in Raphael's famous painting *The School of Athens*, in which Plato and Aristotle are pictured together, the one pointing heavenward toward the realm of the ideal Forms and the other gesturing downward to the earth which, for Aristotelians, was the truly real world.

Plato's notion of human development was fundamentally backward-looking—the prisoner in the cave was really trying to go back to a pristine state that he had lost, but for Aristotle human development was as forward-looking as any other sort of organic development. It was a goal-seeking sort of process, not a form-recalling one. It was, in a word, teleological. Just as the internal dynamism or *telos* of an acorn is to grow into an oak tree, so the *telos* of human beings is to develop into fully functioning, happy, flourishing rational animals. And that is what organisms do when nothing goes wrong. Of course things can go wrong and often do, for people as well as acorns. Even so, the acorns have an easier time of it, since they cannot err. Unless certain external conditions are absent (the acorn falls onto a sidewalk rather than fertile soil) growth is guaranteed, for the simple reason that acorns are not conscious of the end-state they are moving toward.

With this we come to what may be the two most important yet least understood parts of Aristotle's theory of human development and, accordingly, his conception of character and character education. The first part is his conception of the human *telos* as living in conformity with reason. Such a life may appear from the outside to be hopelessly conventional, but if the "reason" to which a person conforms is his or her *own* reason and not just an external social norm then it is clearly wrong to equate good character with mindless conformity. Even so, Aristotle is often read in the latter way, owing to the second part of his theory of human development, namely his account of character acquisition as "habituation." These two themes, "conformity with reason" and "habituation," need to be disentangled if we are to understand the relation between classical Aristotelian virtue theory and contemporary theories of moral education.

There is an important ambiguity in Aristotle's use of the term "reason" in the context of moral character and virtue. Sometimes he seems to mean the individual's own historically situated cognitive faculty and at other times he echoes Plato's notion of Reason as a transcendent reality that by its very nature always seizes upon the truth. The latter impression is strengthened by W. D. Ross's famous translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984), where the original Greek *orthos logos* is rendered as "right rule" (1138b25).[5] However, more recent scholarship regards this choice as far too Kantian, so that now the preferred translations are "right reason" and "practical wisdom." Indeed, the more colloquial (and more literal) phrase "straight thinking" may be even closer to what Aristotle has in mind, but this is not the place to quibble over terminology. What is important is that for Aristotle moral reasoning was an interpretation of here-and-now situations, not the imposition of antecedently known eternal principles onto the empirical phenomena of the present moment.

Over the last 20 or 30 years this point has been made repeatedly by Aristotle scholars, but it is only slowly percolating into the respective literatures of moral development and character education. In his early work Kohlberg (1970) dismissed virtue theory as an essentially noncognitive bundle of habits that were not only conceptually and psychologically disconnected from each other (character being considered as "a bag of virtues") but also too situation-specific to be the subject of any realistic education program. He eventually qualified this view (see Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989) but the line had been drawn, and character educationists such as W. Bennett (1991) who resisted the Kohlbergian characterization of virtue as knowledge of the good also implicitly resisted the idea at the heart of Aristotle's own view, namely that virtue is cognitive through and through. It is, as he put it in the *Ethics*, "a character state concerned with choice, lying in the mean relative to us, being determined by reason and the way the person of practical wisdom would determine it" (1107a1).

This idea of practical wisdom or *phronesis*—sometimes rather misleadingly translated as "prudence"—is the core of what we might call Aristotle's interactive model of cognitive developmental and social learning moral psychology. Moral goodness and wisdom are necessary conditions for each other, in that a person cannot be fully good without practical wisdom nor practically wise without also being virtuous. So put—and this was the way Aristotle himself put it (1144b31–2)—this famous dictum may sound like a chicken-and-egg sort of circular argument. But if we temporarily suspend the chronological question of which precedes which, and instead analyze separately what Nancy Sherman (1989) has called the four areas of practical wisdom, we can see what Aristotle had in mind. We can also see the general outlines of what he would have said about the current disconnection between the cognitive developmental and character formation models of moral education.

The four areas of practical wisdom that Sherman identifies (while adding that there may be more) are perception, deliberation (choice-making), collaborative thinking, and habituation. Each of these areas has its own logical geography and developmental course, and of course all four overlap in important ways. Each has been the subject of arcane debates among philosophers, classicists, and philologists, but their basic features are reassuringly familiar to anyone who has raised children or engaged in any sort of moral education. The first area, perception, is essentially interpretative, since it is the ability to pick out the salient features of a situation. The person with good moral perception can "read the scene" in much the same way as a person with good social skills knows what to

say at a funeral, an art critic sees when things come together in a painting or concert, a military commander realizes when the battle is turning, or a coach quickly sizes up the other team's strengths and weaknesses.

This description of perception begins with the concrete situation and is therefore quite different from the top-down account of moral reasoning that is also identified with Aristotle, namely the practical syllogism. In the latter account moral cognition is modeled on deductive inference, where a major and minor premise logically entail a conclusion. Analogously, the so-called practical syllogism (Aristotle himself never used this term) combines a general value statement such as "My goal is X" with a factual statement about the here-and-now situation such as "Doing Y on this occasion will lead to X," from which the conclusion follows, "Therefore I should do Y."[6] True, the practical syllogism model incorporates perception—after all, the situation-specific minor premise would be impossible without it—but only as an accessory to the transsituational and personally neutral value or moral principle that constitutes the major premise. For this reason it would be a mistake to reduce Aristotle's notion of perception to the task of applying abstract principles to specific situations. Moral cognition and its developmental story run in the opposite direction: our general knowledge of what counts as courageous, just, etc. is the resultant of many specific interpretations of real world situations. Perception is part of the moral response, not its prelude. As Sherman aptly puts it, "Pursuing the ends of virtue does not begin with making choices, but with recognizing the circumstances relevant to specific ends" (p. 4).

One might object that some people are just born with greater social sensitivity than others, and that it would be unfair to regard them as more moral than someone who, perhaps because of a harsh upbringing or a cognitive processing deficit, often fails to pick up important social cues. However, Aristotle sees the distribution of moral sensibility as an educational problem, not a fairness issue. He would applaud the "sensitivity training" that is now part of our corporate culture as well of the school and the family. He would, I think, see such efforts as constituting an essential component of moral education.

But of course seeing and doing are not identical. They are different moments of virtuous action, and this difference takes us to Aristotle's second area of practical wisdom, which is the deliberation that precedes choice-making. Like sensitivity, deliberative thinking is a skill that can be learned, in moral as well as nonmoral contexts. Here again we can think of the corporate sector, where management trainees are expected to participate in workshops and other sorts of programs in which they learn how to improve their ability to determine which actions are most appropriate means toward selected ends. This ability includes such subskills as being able to prioritize multiple goals and to integrate them in ways that minimizes conflict. The analogy with moral deliberation should be obvious, regardless of whether training in this area is done formally or informally. Instruction, modeling, trial and error, vicarious experience through historical or literary narratives, debates about hypothetical cases—moral educators have used such practices for centuries.

Aristotle's third area of practical wisdom is collaborative thinking, which is both the source and the fruit of hands-on collaboration. Collaboration can be on any scale and at any level of sophistication: within the family, among friends, civic activity, and even across national boundaries. In every case the cognitive requirement is the ability to take the perspective of another, and the affective requirement is the tendency to care about whatever is revealed when one takes such a perspective. Its most primitive version is

collaboration for mutual benefit, but Aristotle believed that it is in our nature as "political animals"—*zoon politikon*—to care about common goods such as the quality of our family life itself, the preservation of our friendships, the prestige of our city, and so on. This expansion of our horizons includes an increased sensitivity to social complexity: children develop better understandings of why their parents worry about the things they do, lovers learn new things about their own motivations, citizens discover in public debate issues they never dreamed of, and so on. Social bonds are not blind attachments but rather richly cognitive relationships, shaped not only by day-to-day interactions with family members, friends, and associates but also by what is now called civic education. The pedagogies for civic education are controversial—what is the correct ratio of discipline to creativity, how to combine respect for authority with critical thinking, etc.—but there is little doubt that Aristotle thought collaborative thinking, like perception and deliberation, is something that can be learned, and that this learning process was an integral component of moral education.

As we turn to the fourth area of practical wisdom, habituation, it might seem that here Aristotle's emphasis will be on noncognitive processes. Many commentators as well as moral educators who invoke Aristotle have interpreted him in that way, but within the scholarly community the tide shifted a few decades ago (see Burnyeat, 1980; Rorty, 1980; Nussbaum, 1986; Sherman, 1989; Sorabji, 1973–1974). Those who continue to favor the noncognitive interpretation take quite literally Aristotle's distinction between the intellectual and moral virtues, according to which the latter consist in habits that regulate the "irrational" parts of the soul—i.e., the passions. These habits, Aristotle tells us, are acquired in childhood by means of external shaping factors such as discipline, good example, and above all by the repetition of good acts. In this way, we are told, the child develops moral virtue as a "second nature," a phrase that character education theorists sometimes confuse with simple conformity.

The problem with that interpretation of Aristotle is that, as Sherman explains, "it leaves unexplained how the child with merely 'habituated' virtue can ever develop the capacities requisite for practical reason and inseparable for full virtue" (p. 158). As we have seen, Aristotle insisted that full virtue is possible only with practical wisdom (1144b30–33), which includes the heavily cognitive areas or dimensions of perception of salience, choice-making abilities, and collaborative thinking. It is far more plausible, as an interpretation of Aristotle but also as a description of our own children's early development, to suppose that habituation includes not only rewards and punishments but also reasoned explanations as to why certain actions are rewarded or punished, certain persons are held up as models, and so on. For a child to lack adult-level practical wisdom does not imply that he or she has no cognitive capacities for reading situations, making choices, or taking the perspective of others. Furthermore, a closer look at what Aristotle said about the so-called nonrational parts of the soul—i.e., the passions or emotions— shows that even the crudest responses of fear or anger or desire have cognitive dimensions and hence can be directed by one's own intelligence as well as by external pressures.

To sum up so far, it seems that each of Aristotle's first three areas of practical wisdom has its own educational agenda or pedagogy. Perception is developed through sensitivity training, which includes teaching children how to pick out the morally salient features of a situation. Deliberative thinking is developed through what might be called managerial pedagogy, which shapes the ability to set goals and figure out how to meet them. And collaborative thinking is developed through perspective-taking training and, on a larger

scale, civic education. But what about his fourth area, habituation? Does it have its own pedagogy too?

Yes and no. Aristotle went to great length to explain how moral teachers—typically parents—should use discipline, modeling, and consistent repetition to enable the learner to acquire the right habits. This is the pedagogy of habit formation, but it should not be understood as radically distinct from the other three areas of practical wisdom. Virtue is itself a habit and so are all its component skills. For instance, children develop the habit of reading common household social situations (perception) by observing their mother's sensitive response to a sibling's unspoken needs, they develop an established habit of carefully weighing the pros and cons of any course of action (deliberation) by doing so on repeated occasions, and they expand their interpersonal horizons to civic readiness (collaborative thinking) by emulating leaders whom they see praised and honored for their service to the community. For Aristotle moral education was organic, not modular: each component pedagogy made its own contribution to the goal of living a life in conformity to reason, but as it did so it provided the necessary conditions and platforms for the other pedagogies. This integration of functions was only to be expected in a fundamentally teleological philosophical system such as Aristotle's.

Aristotelian teleology has as its contemporary counterpart recent psychological and educational theories in which reality, especially moral reality, is understood in developmental terms. It should therefore come as no surprise to learn that cognitive developmentalists such as Piaget and Kohlberg sometimes compare Aristotle's account of habituation to their own accounts of the early stages of moral competence (see Power et al., 1989, p. 134). Such comparisons are plausible, but we should not identify Aristotle too closely with any contemporary psychological theory. His recognition of the importance of external pressures such as discipline, good example, trial and error, and above all the repetition of good acts is also compatible with the more cognitive approaches of social learning theory, such as Martin Hoffman's (2000) "induction,"[7] which emphasizes the role of reason-giving in parent–child relationships, or Walter Mischel's (1968, p. 150) "observational learning," which is mediated by perceptual–cognitive processes. It is safest to say that Aristotle's theory of habituation and, for that reason plus others, his entire ethical theory is underdetermined as far as contemporary moral psychology is concerned. Even though much of what he says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and elsewhere is clearly incompatible with hard-core behaviorist or associationist approaches to moral socialization, and even though his account of moral education has important developmental features, it leaves open important questions such as whether the acquisition of moral habits is best understood in stage-structural terms, according to which the cognitive capabilities discussed above (perception, etc.) either advance in tandem or are clustered in distinct and increasingly complex ways during the child's developmental career. Perhaps the best way to characterize Aristotle's thought in this important area is to say that it seems to be more a refinement of common sense than deep psychological theory. That moral virtue is indeed part of the human *telos* is old news.

BRITISH EMPIRICISM

We now skip over the transformations of Aristotelian teleology wrought by the Roman Stoics who turned philosophy into a "therapy of desire" (Nussbaum, 1994) and later by the medieval scholastics who baptized the very idea of goal-seeking and treated it as

part of the larger story of divine providence and salvation history. We even rush past the opening century of modernity, when in the 1630s René Descartes rejected the teleological model itself, dismissing it as the keystone of the existing ramshackle edifice of unwarranted assumptions, beliefs, superstitions, and appeals to tradition. These were all important phases in the history of philosophy and the formation of our contemporary views of human nature, but they are not of special relevance to contemporary theories and practices of moral education or character formation. However, the so-called "empiricist" phase that came next was not only relevant but amounted to a radical break with what was then the established view of human development.

John Locke. And so we come to rest in the following century, and take up the so-called Father of British Empiricism, John Locke (1632–1704). Uninspired by the worn-out scholasticism current when he was a student at Oxford, Locke cheerfully embraced Descartes' repudiation of tradition as the font of wisdom. However, he rejected its accompanying theory of innate ideas and other cognitive structures. In this respect Locke and the empiricists who followed him had the same ambivalence toward Descartes that Aristotle had toward Plato's notion of self-standing ideal forms.

What psychologists now call human development was a relatively unanalyzed notion in British empiricism. Locke never directly challenged the general Aristotelian model of human flourishing, which he inherited from scholastic philosophy and the conventional Christianity of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Here as elsewhere, he took a common sense approach to human nature, as did the philosophers who followed him. However, he replaced Aristotle's dynamic notion of human development as the unfolding of an inner teleology with his own relatively static notion of experience as receptivity to external perceptions or "inputs." For instance, Locke believed our moral understanding is shaped by a combination of natural prosocial "sentiments" and experiences (observations) of prosocial behavior in others.

Locke's famous image of the mind was a "blank slate" (*tabula rasa*). It lies at the heart of the conception that he and other empiricists such as David Hume and Adam Smith had regarding what counted for them as human development. The blank slate metaphor has two parts: (1) there are no innate ideas (certain ideas such as the moral principle of the Golden rule and principles of identity and contradiction are self-evident, but that does not make them innate), and (2) experience is the only stylus that can write on the slate. There were, said Locke, two sources of experience: *sensation* (which was the primary source, derived from sensible objects external to the mind), and *reflection* (the secondary source, entirely internal to the mind). Among the latter are moral ideas, but Locke left it to his successors to spell out exactly how these ideas emerge.

David Hume. The most important of these successors, especially in matters of moral psychology, is undoubtedly David Hume (1711–1776). Like Locke he located moral ideas and their corresponding passions under the category of "ideas of reflection" since they were not immediate perceptions of an external reality. He shared Locke's belief that their mutual predecessor Thomas Hobbes had gone too far in his account of psychological egoism, according to which all action, even moral action, is motivated solely by self-interest. Their more moderate position was that motives of benevolence as well as self-interest are operative in human affairs. However, in his *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) Hume went on to argue that the way we actually make moral judgments is to approve or disapprove certain actions rather than to describe any unique moral quality they might have. Since as far as he could tell most of the actions we approve of

happen to increase public utility, he concluded that we have a natural tendency (motivation) to consider and promote the well-being of others. The "calm passion" of benevolence combines with "pleasurable impressions" such as knowing one is esteemed by others, and thereby creates what learning theorists would later call schedules of internal reinforcement.

In sum, Hume believed that morality is based on affectivity, not rationality, that our nature includes not only the power to reason but also two types of passion, namely self-regarding and other-regarding sentiments, and that successful social systems cultivate both sorts of affectivity. Moral development consists in the cultivation and balance of the sentiments, but he did not think there is any special cognitive framework within which this development must take place.

There are several reasons for this absence, but the main one is Hume's associationist theory of knowledge in general. Wielding Ockham's razor, he did away with the assumption that ideas necessarily have a one-for-one correspondence to the components of external reality. Whatever coherence the world (or the self) seems to have is, he claimed, a matter of the simple application to our mental life of three natural laws of association, namely the laws of resemblance, contiguity, and causality (which is basically contiguity in time rather than space). Note that what is associated in these laws are not things or events in the world but introspectible entities, namely ideas, taken in the broad sense as including the internal contents of all experience.

The educational implications of this skeptical disconnect between the way our ideas are configured and the way the external world is configured are profound, and they are especially profound in the case of moral education. What is learned are regular relations between certain kinds of experiences and certain kinds of perception, typically the sentiment-laden perception that one is the object of other persons' approval or the experience of benevolent feelings. How these relationships are learned varies. Sometime the learning in question is the simple repetition of a pair of ideas or mental events such as the smell of cigarette smoke and the pain of a sublethal electric shock, and sometimes it is a very complicated set of resemblances and correlations such as what the social learning theorist Albert Bandura has called "observational learning," which is to say watching human models. As he explains,

> By observing others, one forms rules of behavior, and on future occasions this coded information serves as a guide for action…. Throughout the years, modeling has always been acknowledged to be one of the most powerful means of transmitting values, attitudes, and patterns of thought and behavior.
>
> (1986, p. 47)

Absent from this quotation is any hint of *why* or *how* the simple experience or set of experiences of seeing a model perform a certain action leads one to form a rule for that action. Like Hume, Bandura applied Ockham's razor to lop off any epistemological account of the correlation between observation and rule-formation. Although he prefers to be called a "social cognitive theorist" Bandura's approach to observational learning is at bottom as epistemologically barren as Pavlov's classical conditioning paradigm or B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism (see Wren, 1991, ch. 3). The same could be said of any program of moral education that was governed by Hume's three laws of association as closely as Bandura was in the passage just quoted.

KANT

It was perhaps inevitable that Hume's skepticism about our moral and scientific know-ledge of the external world would generate a counter-skepticism about the validity of the entire empiricist program. However, when the reaction came it was not a return to the straightforward realism of classical philosophy but rather an entirely new conception of philosophical inquiry, known from its very beginnings as "transcendental critique." Its founder was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who began his philosophical career in much the same way that Locke did a century earlier, working within the scholastic dogmatism that had somehow lingered on during the modern era. This came to an end for Kant when, in what must have been the philosophical equivalent of a midlife crisis, he read Hume's work and, as he later put it, awoke from his dogmatic slumbers.

The rationalists inspired by Descartes and the empiricists inspired by Locke shared the same goal of explaining how our concepts can match the nature of objects, but Kant changed the program. Taking what is now called a constructionist approach, he argued that philosophers must show how the structure of our concepts shapes our experience of the world. He broke this huge task into two parts. The first was to establish the con-ditions under which (Newtonian) scientific knowledge—and by extension any experi-ence whatsoever—is possible, which he did in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1998). Then, using similar categories and methods of argument, he went on to establish the conditions of the possibility of any *moral* experience, first in his famous *Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785/1959) and then in the more formidable *Critique of Prac-tical Reason* (1788/1956).

Unlike the empiricists, Kant had a clear and radically new conception of human development: personal autonomy. Paradoxically, the way one becomes autonomous is by obeying the law, especially the moral law. But one must obey the law for the right reasons, which is to say from motives of duty rather than the "inclinations" of self-interest. (Note that Kant saw nothing intrinsically wrong with acting from inclination, as long as one does not do so *instead of* acting from duty. He was, in fact, something of a bon vivant according to many reports.) Kant unfolded his idea of moral autonomy as follows. Since a truly good person is one who has internalized and follows the moral law, the core con-ception of moral agency is not the teleological notion of human flourishing or virtue but rather the *deontological* notion (from the Greek word for duty, *deon*) of following a self-imposed rule. Simply put, when I act from inclinations—which range from crude sensual desire to the composite desire for happiness—I am letting my actions be ruled by something other than my own will. I am properly described as acting under the rule of something "other," which Kant called heteronomy of the will. But when I act in accord with a law that I generate and impose on myself as a rational member of the human com-munity, I am self-ruled, which is of course the literal meaning of the word autonomy. Like all legislation, the moral law is formulated as a set of prescriptions, commands, or *imperatives*, which Kant divides into sorts: hypothetical and categorical.

"*Hypothetical*": As the term suggests, hypothetical imperatives, like hypothetical state-ments, have an "if-then" structure, linking an antecedent condition and a consequent action or action-mandate. The action that is the object of the command is considered good simply because it is a means to achieve an ulterior end or proposition (the ante-cedent): "If you want *y*, do *x*," or negatively, "Avoid *x* if you want *y*." Seemingly moral injunctions such as "Keep your promises if you want people to trust you," and "Don't

steal if you want to avoid problems with the police," are hypothetical in form and for that reason not really part of the moral law.

"*Categorical*": In contrast, a truly moral action has neither antecedent nor consequent components. Its rightness is simply unconditioned, that is, independent of considerations of external goals or circumstance. There are no "ifs, ands, or buts": the action is commanded simply because it is considered to be of value in itself. Thus the general form of a moral imperative is "Do *x*" or "Don't do *y*"—as in "Keep your promises" and "Don't steal."

Of course it is possible to issue obviously nonmoral commands that are categorical in the trivial sense that no antecedent is uttered, as when a parent says, "Wash your hands before coming to the table." What makes a truly moral imperative different from "Keep your promises" is, then, something over and above the simple absence of an antecedent term. This "special something" is, Kant believed, a formal quality of the *maxim* underlying the action in question, a point that Kohlberg (1981, p. 135 *et passim*) later seized upon in order to differentiate his judgment-oriented approach from the content-oriented approach typical of character education.

To examine this quality we first need to understand Kant's notion of a maxim or, to use a phrase common in contemporary analytic philosophy, the relevant act-description. Kant's own example is a person who normally tells the truth but is prepared to lie if doing so is to his or her advantage. Such a person has adopted the maxim "I will lie whenever doing so is to my advantage," and is acting on that maxim whenever he or she engages in lying behavior. Of course many maxims have nothing to do with morality, since they are purely pragmatic policies such as straightening one's desk at the end of each workday or not picking up hitchhikers.

Now we can identify the "special something" that makes a maxim a moral maxim. For Kant it was the maxim's *universalizability*. (Note that *universalizability* is a fundamentally different concept than *universality*, which refers to the fact that some thing or concept not only should be found everywhere but actually is. However, the two concepts sometimes flow into each other: human rights are said to be universal not in the sense that they are actually conceptualized and respected in all cultures but rather in the sense that reason requires that they *should* be. And this is a moral "should.") However, in the course of developing this idea, Kant produced several formulations of the Categorical Imperative, all of which turn on the idea of universalizability. Commentators usually distinguish the following five versions:

1. "*Act only according to a maximum that at the same time you could will that it should become a universal law.*" In other words, a moral maxim is one that any rationally consistent human being would want to adopt and see others adopt. The above-mentioned maxim of lying when doing so is to one's advantage fails this test, since if there were a rule that everyone could or even should lie under such circumstances no one would believe anyone—which of course is utterly incoherent. Making such a maximum standard practice would destroy the very point of lying.

2. "*Act as if the maxim directing your action should be converted, by your will, into a universal law of nature.*" The first version showed that immoral maxims are *logically* incoherent. The phrase "as if" in this second formulation shows that they are also untenable on *empirical* grounds. Quite simply, no one would ever want to live in a world that was by its very nature populated only by people living according to immoral maxims.

3. *"Act in a way that treats all humanity, yourself and all others, always as an end, and never simply as a means."* The point here is that to be moral a maxim must be oriented toward the preservation, protection, and safeguarding of all human beings, simply because they are beings which are intrinsically valuable, that is to say ends in themselves. Of course much cooperative activity involves "using" others in the weak sense of getting help from them, but moral cooperation always includes the recognition that those who help us are also persons like ourselves and not mere tools to be used to further our own ends.

4. *"Act in a way that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim."* This version is much like the first one, but it adds the important link between morality and personal autonomy: when we act morally we are actually making the moral law that we follow.

5. *"Act as if by means of your maxims, you were always acting as a universal legislator, in a possible kingdom of ends."* Finally, the maxim must be acceptable as a norm or law in a possible kingdom of ends. This formulation brings together the ideas of legislative rationality, universalizability, and autonomy. What Kant had in mind can be illustrated by imagining an ideal parliament of partisan but nonetheless civil senators or deputies who have, over and above their personal feelings, deep-seated respect for each other *as legislators*, typically accompanied by courtly rhetoric such as "I would respectfully remind my esteemed colleague from the great state of ____ that…"

Like most philosophers who discuss the way we think about moral issues, Kant took as his normal case a fully functional adult living in a basically decent environment. But cognitive developmental psychologists who focus on children's moral reasoning processes have also worked in the long shadow of Kant ever since Jean Piaget wrote his *Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932/1965). This work is now a classic scholarly resource for moral educational theory. The same can be said of much of the work by Lawrence Kohlberg, whose first publication in 1958 was a doctoral study based on Piaget and whose last publications appeared posthumously as late as 1990 (Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine, 1990). In both cases they charted the development of the child's ability to make moral judgments about the rightness or wrongness of specific (though hypothetical) actions, and in both cases claimed to discover an ordered set of stages that began with what Kant called heteronomous principles of action and ended with autonomous principles.

The logical structures of Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages are, of course, well known, but what is not always clear is the dynamic by which the child moves through the sequence. Here we find no help from Kant, who apparently assumed that a clear-thinking person of any age would have an intrinsic motivation to think and act autonomously, even though moral struggle always remained a logical as well as empirical possibility. Surprisingly, one of the best accounts of our tendency to reason autonomously can be found in Aristotle's treatment of collaborative thinking. As we saw above, he posited an innate prosociality (the human person as *zoon politikon*) that was realized in the quest for shared goods at various levels of inclusiveness. Aristotle's conceptions of human flourishing and moral standards were typically ethnocentric, but there does seem to be an important affinity between his idea that people are political animals and Kant's idea of moral agents as "universal legislators in a possible kingdom of ends." If so, then the developmental dynamic in question may be connected in important ways with the Kantian constructionist epistemology that

Piaget and Kohlberg deployed. As they explain in various contexts, children (and adults, at least in Kohlberg's scheme) move from one stage to the next because of interactions that take place between them and other persons: conflicting social demands, questions proposed by others who think differently, responsibilities for distributing resources, and so on. Toward the end of his career Kohlberg decided that classroom discussions of moral dilemmas were far less effective as occasions of moral growth than were real-life experiences of decision-making. With this realization came the "just community" approach to moral education, which in spite of its Kantian conception of moral reasoning seems to incorporate much of Aristotle's own understanding of practical wisdom.

However, the deep gap between Aristotle and Kant remains. As we saw above, Aristotle believed that practical wisdom, which for him was the supreme moral virtue, is something quite different from principled reasoning. Whereas Kant thought that we first formulate and adjudicate moral maxims and then apply them to concrete situations, Aristotle thought that we first pick out the goods that are at stake in a given situation, then work out the best way to balance these goods in a coherent and publicly responsible way, and then—but only if one is inclined to be a moral philosopher as well as a moral agent—distill all these considerations into a set of moral principles such as those found in his discussion of distributive justice in Chapter 3 of the *Nicomachean Ethics.*

THE AFTERMATH

The history of moral philosophy did not end with Kant, but the parts that have most influenced moral educators did, with of course a few exceptions. One of the most important exceptions is Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), whose conception of the world, including the human world, as the representation of a cosmic force or "Will" influenced Freud and those educators who understand morality primarily in Freudian categories. However, Freud himself insisted that Schopenhauer's influence was incidental to his own discovery of the unconscious and related primary processes, and it seems safe to say that whatever Schopenhauer's influence on Freud really was, it has had no direct impact on moral educators in the English-speaking world. Something of the same sort holds for the moral theories of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) and Nietzsche (1840–1900), whose influence on nineteenth and twentieth century ethical philosophy is not matched by any direct impact their works had on moral education.

Another important exception is John Dewey, who anticipated the cognitive developmental view that human beings advance in their understandings of moral issues in a progressive way. His application of this general psychological principle to the classroom—the controversial "progressive education" pedagogy—foreshadowed the just community approach mentioned a few lines earlier. As Power et al. (1989) once explained, "our basic expectation, derived from the theories of Dewey and Piaget, was that participation in the governance of a small school community would stimulate growth of moral reasoning more than would participation in the more traditionally governed high schools" (p. 266).

Philosophers continue to add their voices to the dialogue of moral and character education, but for the most part they do so by retrieving—or better, refurbishing—the parts of the philosophical tradition that we have surveyed in this chapter. Among more recent moral philosophers the figure of the late John Rawls (1921–2002) towers over all, but without denying his importance it is clear that much of the power of his

social contract theory of justice and its consequent importance for moral educators is an extension of the Kantian approach, as he himself readily acknowledged. Similar retrievals have been made by virtue theorists such as Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–) who advocate a return to the teleological conception of character found in Aristotle, and utilitarian philosophers such as Richard Brandt (1910–1997), whose contributions to the moral education debate were drawn from the deep well of Humean empiricism.

The Global Order. As the twentieth century drew to a close, the difference between virtue-based and principle-based accounts of morality became a philosophical theme in its own right, articulated in what is often identified as the liberal-communitarian debate. Virtue-based accounts portrayed moral agents as motivated by commitments and loyalty to those with whom they share traditions, nationalities, and other sorts of communal bonds. Here the historical roots are in Aristotle's notion of virtue, especially as it operates in friendship relationships. In contrast, principle-based accounts saw moral agents as motivated not by communal ties (except incidentally) but rather by a sense of duty that is grounded in universal and impartial principles of justice prefigured by Kant's Categorical Imperative. Over the last few decades the debate between virtue-oriented and duty-oriented moral philosophers has focused on a variety of issues that have their own educational implications (Wren, 2005). However, since the beginning of the present millennium many of the virtue vs. duty issues have been absorbed into still more complex discussions of *globalization* and its moral implications. In what follows I will quickly frame those discussions and then indicate their relevance to moral education.

It is sometimes remarked that today's moral and political discussions of globalization recapitulate the opposition between cosmopolitanism and nationalism that has been with us since the days of Hellenistic and Roman Stoics. As an abstract generalization in the history of ideas this claim is true enough, but it fails to take seriously the fact that questions about our responsibilities to distant others have a new urgency, thanks largely to technologies and international structures that have emerged in the wake of colonialism and the cold war. Our general obligation to those in far-off lands is no longer a second-tier responsibility, to be addressed only after our more important local obligations have been sorted out and fulfilled.

The complex philosophical structure of our moral responsibility to distant others is part of a still larger evaluative question that already lies at the center of civic education and is beginning to show up in the theory and practice of many moral educators: *What are the normative implications of the increasingly powerful forces of globalization?* Any serious answer to that question must recognize that moral educators and philosophers (as well as public policy specialists and hands-on decision-makers who deal with ethically complex issues of international relations) need a distinctive "ethics in a world of strangers" (Appiah, 2006). And any answer to that question will also have to go beyond the now-familiar philosophical distinction between communitarian and liberal ethical theories. Whatever use that distinction might still have in philosophical accounts of personal decision-making, it seems to be of little help in designing and morally assessing collective strategies and policies concerning large-scale transnational issues such as forced industrial development, governmental corruption, or conflicts between tribal practices and democratic institutions.

In short, we need to develop new philosophical and educational approaches that deal with justice and other moral issues on a global scale. The standard communitarian approach presupposes existing ties to friends, relatives, and fellow nationals. For that

reason it would be illogical to expect it to provide an ethic for a world of strangers, even when the concept of community is expanded to include the regional loyalties of, say, citizens in Latin America or the European Union. Admittedly, not everyone would agree with this assessment. (The pioneer of globalization studies, Roland Robertson [1938–], would certainly disagree.) However, the tendency toward boundary maintenance is now a well-documented characteristic of ethnic and cultural groups (see Barth, 1969), and so it seems empirically as well as logically wrong to view communitarianism as a self-standing globalization ethic.

A somewhat different lack of logic undermines the liberal understanding of global ethics. Philosophers who take that approach to moral questions (e.g., Kant, Mill, Rawls) tend to treat our relation to distant others as a motivationally barren, purely logical connection. For instance the only connection that Kant's Categorical Imperative or the Golden Rule formally acknowledges between "others" and oneself is a common rationality and vulnerability to fear, pain, and death. Whatever validity or motivating force this quintessentially liberal notion might have in personal or small group relationships, it seems clear that in today's globalized world the relationships and corresponding moral obligations we have regarding distant others are much more complex, and that this complexity should be recognized by moral educators. For instance, it is plausible that in the course of our everyday use of the natural resources which multinational corporations have exploited from developing nations through dishonest "rent transfers" (typically a euphemism for certain bribes at the highest levels of government) we become accomplices to the crimes committed by corrupt governments against their own people. Under this interpretation (elaborated by Thomas Pogge, 2002), we have a moral obligation to make restitution, directly or indirectly, to the citizens of that country for the stolen goods we have purchased from its leaders or corporate accomplices, just as we would have an obligation to restore a stolen car to its rightful owner even though we had purchased it unwittingly.

There are many other moral issues generated by globalization that moral educators could and should address. One of the most frequently discussed of those issues is the distribution of resources from wealthy to poor nations. Another is the seemingly paternalistic export of participatory democracy and human rights mandates to non-Western peoples who have other political traditions. National sovereignty is challenged by morally charged efforts to control emissions on a global scale, and policies regarding immigration, free speech, and access to education are now seen as human rights issues. Social, political, and economic problems that used to be local or national issues are now subject to international assessment, as are their remedies and, by implication, the ethical standards for those remedies, especially standards couched in the language of human rights. In a word, civic virtue has taken on a whole new meaning, one that calls for new approaches to the civic dimension of moral education.

More specifically, over the last decade or two it has become increasingly clear that civic virtue should be understood and taught as a special case of moral virtue (see McLaughlin, 1992, and my expansion of his ideas in Wren, 2013). With this new understanding has come a new emphasis on collective action, since there is little that a single individual can do to address justice or benevolence issues in far-off lands, in international contexts, or on any sort of large scale. For this and other reasons *voluntary collective action* now seems to be an important aspect of moral education in global contexts. That the global not-for-profit sector is one of the most effective and accessible fields for such action is shown by

the remarkable increase in the number of international NGOs since 1990 as well as by the explosion of literature devoted to this new version of what the medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) called "commutative justice," namely the responses that individuals and groups should make to the legitimate claims which other individuals and groups—no matter how distant—have on them (*Summa Theologica* [1265–1273/1945], II, II Q61a1; see also Edwards and Gaventa, 2001).

CONCLUSION

So where does this leave us? Good answers to that question are to be found throughout this book. To return to the "mooring" metaphor that introduced the present chapter, we should keep in mind that the various assertions, denials, interpretations, and methodologies offered throughout this volume are not free-floating intellectual constructions but rather are moored to long-standing but still-evolving philosophical traditions. However, they are moored in different ways and tied to different mooring posts, by which I mean that their underlying assumptions are drawn from significantly different philosophical conceptions of what it means to be—and to develop into—a fully human person. Understanding how their respective philosophical infrastructures differ will not resolve the complex theoretical and practical differences among moral educators, but it will enable them to take each other's perspective more thoroughly and, let us hope for the sake of our children and ourselves, more productively.

NOTES

1. For an example of the "outside view," consider Robert Dreeben's (1968) structural functionalist conception of the school as

   > an agency of socialization whose task is to effect psychological changes that enable persons to make transitions among other institutions; that is, to develop capacities necessary for appropriate conduct in social settings that make different kinds of demands on [students] and pose different kinds of opportunities. (p. 3)

2. This point has been discussed at length by Ger Snik and other contributors to a volume entitled *Philosophy of Development: Reconstructing the Foundations of Human Development and Education* (van Haaften, Korthals, & Wren, 1997). As Snik explains, "The question is not whether we should use the notion of development but only what specific conception of development is most appropriate in educational contexts" (Snik, 1997, p. 202).

3. Here as elsewhere it is hard to separate their respective views of the Forms since most of what we know of Socrates comes from his role in Plato's dialogues, especially the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. Following the usual practice in Plato scholarship, I have used the Stephanus method of pagination when referring to specific passages in Plato's works (see Plato, 1997).

4. In the introduction to the first volume of his collected writings Kohlberg (1981, p. xxix) presents an eight-point summary of the elements of Plato's conception of justice that he incorporated in his own work. His third point is especially relevant here: "Virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good."

5. Ross's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is contained in Aristotle, 1984. A much better overall translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the one by C. Rowe, contained in Aristotle, 2002. Note, by the way, that in my discussion of Aristotle I have followed the usual practice of using line numbers (the Bekker numbers) rather than page numbers since there are so many different translations of Aristotle's work.

6. Some philosophers prefer to say the conclusion is not "I should" or any other sort of statement but rather the decision itself to do Y—or even the act of doing Y.

7. Hoffman defines this oddly named parenting technique as "the type of discipline … in which parents highlight the other's perspective, point up the other's distress, and make it clear that the child's action caused it" (2000, p. 143).

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5

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS

Moral Education in the Cognitive-Developmental Tradition

John Snarey and Peter L. Samuelson

INTRODUCTION

Lawrence Kohlberg's ideas about moral formation and moral education were revolutionary. He made morality a central concern in psychology, and he remains the person most often identified as a founding figure in the field of moral psychology, including moral development and moral education. He understood that children and adolescents, as well as adults, are *developing* moral philosophers, capable of forming their own moral judgments and capable of revising them. Kohlberg is best known for his three models of moral formation (moral stages, types, and atmosphere) and his three methods of moral education (moral exemplars, dilemma discussions, and Just Community schools). Overall, Kohlberg created lasting frameworks for approaching the study of moral cognition and development and inspired educational programs to prepare citizens for living in a participatory democracy.

Kohlberg (1958, 1969), like all revolutionary thinkers, also stands on the shoulders of his predecessors. Kohlberg's approach to moral education is rooted in the theories and methods of Jean Piaget (1896–1980) and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917). The ideas of these two giants in the field of moral development and education are also evident in contemporary approaches to moral and character education. The approach most influenced by Piaget is often called Moral Education. It emphasizes that students participate in moral thought and action through moral dilemma discussions, role-play, collaborative peer interaction, and a democratic classroom and school culture. Another approach more influenced by Durkheim is often called Character Education. It emphasizes the direct teaching of virtues and exemplary character traits, role modeling, and reinforcement of good behavior (Althof & Berkowitz, 2006; Berkowitz, 2012). Kohlberg draws creatively from both traditions in fashioning his approach to moral development and education.

PIAGET'S COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

Piaget viewed the development of morality through the lens of his "cognitive-developmental" theory. In this view, a series of organized cognitive structures that govern a child's thoughts and actions are transformed in an ordered sequence as the child constructs, through interaction with the environment, increasingly useful and more complex cognitive operations. In *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, Piaget (1932) distinguished two types of moral reasoning, each of which shows a different understanding of respect, fairness, and punishment:

1. *Heteronomous morality.* Initially morality is based on unilateral respect for authorities and the rules they prescribe. Fairness is understood as obedience to authorities and conformity to their "sacred" rules; consequences are understood as concrete, objective damage, which carries more weight than intentions; expiatory punishment is the favored way of making things right.
2. *Autonomous morality.* Morality is based on mutual respect, reciprocity, and equality among peers. Fairness is understood as mutually agreed upon cooperation and reciprocal exchange. Intentionality is understood as relevant; both intentions and consequences can be kept in mind concurrently; punishment by reciprocity is favored.

Piaget saw moral development as the movement from heteronomous morality to autonomous morality and believed that social interactions, especially with peers, would fuel moral development.

Piaget was a strong advocate of democratic educational methods and critiqued what he believed to be Durkheim's position on this point:

> The problem is to know what will best prepare the child for its future task of citizenship…. For ourselves we regard as of the utmost importance the experiments that have been made to introduce democratic methods into schools. We therefore do not at all agree with Durkheim in thinking that it is the master's business to impose or even to "reveal" rules to the child.
>
> (1932, pp. 363–364)

Piaget claimed that educators best promote mature moral reasoning by talking with children as equals in the search for knowledge rather than with indoctrinative authority that promotes the consolidation of childish reasoning. Piaget considered his moral development approach to be the "opposite pole from the Durkheimian pedagogy" (1932, p. 362).

DURKHEIM'S CULTURAL SOCIALIZATION APPROACH

Durkheim's core principles are laid out in his 1902 and 1903 lecture series, published posthumously as *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education* (1925). At the center of Durkheim's approach is collective socialization or cultural transmission, which is the process whereby a person learns society's norms and expectations through instruction and explanation, role models, and group

reinforcement. Therefore, education for moral character is primarily about social solidarity, group conformity, and mutual support.

Durkheim maintained that social norms were the most effective means of control, not because they are socially imposed from the outside, but because they are voluntarily internalized and come to function as the society's norms living within its members. He posited three elements of morality:

Spirit of discipline. Morality requires respect for social norms and authority and consistent conduct.

Spirit of altruism. Morality requires that persons be attached to and identified with social groups.

Autonomy or self-determination. Though the society is the final authority for the child, the child must freely choose whether to follow the society's rules.

Durkheim held that collective responsibility, applied with restraint and judgment, is central to moral education. Thus, in the practice of moral education, the school has a crucial and clearly specified function: to create a new being shaped according to the needs of society. Kohlberg, influenced by Piaget's writings on Durkheim, originally saw striking limitations to this method and derisively labeled contemporary attempts at moral socialization as a "bag of virtues" approach:

Although it may be true that the notion of teaching virtues, such as honesty or integrity, arouses little controversy, it is also true that vague consensus on the goodness of these virtues conceals a great deal of actual disagreement over their definitions. What is one person's "integrity" is another person's "stubbornness," what is one person's honesty in "expressing your true feelings" is another person's insensitivity to the feelings of others.

(Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 9–10)

Kohlberg believed that an enculturation approach leaves one open to ethical relativity, and he did not want to base his approach on socially relative virtues.

Kohlberg eventually realized that Piaget had attacked something of a caricature of Durkheim. Both Piaget and Durkheim agreed, for instance, that moral behavior entails cognitive understanding and the exercise of free will, not just imitating role models or ideals of virtue. As Durkheim was careful to indicate, "To teach morality is neither to preach nor to indoctrinate; it is to explain" (1925, p. 20). Beyond their shared belief in the egoism of the child, both also stressed the importance of groups' social relations for the child's development, and that morality is formed in the context of relationships and role taking experiences (cf. Selman, 1971, 2003). Finally, both viewed a school's classroom dynamics and authority structure as inevitably involved in moral education (cf. Power, 2004).

KOHLBERG'S REFINED DEVELOPMENTAL-SOCIALIZATION APPROACH

Kohlberg's work is primarily identified with the "cognitive-developmental paradigm." His stage theory of moral development, like Piaget's, postulates that moral reasoning

proceeds through an invariant sequence of stages toward an increasingly adequate understanding of what is just or fair. In this view, the child is a philosopher who actively constructs and makes sense of his or her world. The educator's aim is to provide the conditions that promote the natural progression of moral judgment by providing ethically enriched and stimulating educational experiences within which a child is allowed to exercise moral choice. Motivated by insights gained during educational efforts, Kohlberg reread and reconsidered Durkheim. He came to see that the unit of education was the group, not simply the individual, and that moral education should change a school's moral culture, not only develop a person's moral reasoning. In one of his first public statements of his revised perspective, Kohlberg said:

> It is not a sufficient guide to the moral educator, who deals with concrete morality in a school world in which value content as well as structure, behavior as well as reasoning, must be dealt with. In this context, an educator must be a socializer, teaching value content and behavior, not merely a Socratic or Rogerian process-facilitator of development. In becoming a socializer and advocate, the teacher moves into "indoctrination," a step that I originally believed to be invalid … I no longer hold these negative views of indoctrinative moral education.… Now I believe that moral education can be in the form of advocacy or "indoctrination" without violating the child's rights if there is an explicit recognition of shared rights of teachers and students and as long as teacher advocacy is democratic, or subject to the constraints of recognizing student participation in the rule-making and value-upholding process.
>
> (1978, pp. 14–15)

Moral development and education, thus revised, involve a synthesis of both the democratic socialization of moral content and the developmental promotion of moral reasoning. By democratizing Durkheim, Kohlberg hoped to give priority to the power of the collective in a way that also protected the rights of the individual. These two concepts—the cognitive-developmental promotion of moral reasoning and the collective socialization of moral content—form the foundation on which Kohlberg constructed his three models of moral cognition and his three approaches to moral education.

KOHLBERG'S THREE MODELS OF MORAL COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT

Kohlberg is renowned for his stage model of moral development. Though his basic stage theory had changed little since its inception in his dissertation study (1958, 2008), Kohlberg augmented it with two additional models. Thus, within the paradigm of structuralism, Kohlberg actually created three models: (1) moral stages, (2) moral types, and (3) social-moral atmosphere levels. Together, they provide a fairly comprehensive view of human moral cognition and development.

Moral Stages

Kohlberg believed that moral judgment development progressed through six stages: cognitively structured moral reasoning steps that follow an invariant sequence. What drives moral development is the adequacy or inadequacy of moral thought structures in making sense of experience. The human mind assimilates the environment to existing thought

structures and, when this assimilation fails, accommodates by modifying them to more adequately make sense of environmental moral issues. Kohlberg used moral dilemma interviews as his research tool; he presented the equivalent of nine dilemmas to a cohort of 84 adolescent boys and then studied how they reasoned about the dilemmas.

Whereas Piaget primarily saw two thought structures in moral reasoning (outlined above), Kohlberg believed that six age-related thought structures best described his subject's reasoning about the dilemmas. In the moral realm, that is, a person progresses from focusing on the self, in which he or she tries to avoid punishment or maximize gains (pre-conventional stages 1 & 2), to include the perspective of those in close relation to himself or herself, which will eventually include whole systems of relationships expressed in groups, institutions, and society as a whole (conventional stages 3 & 4). According to Kohlberg, a person cannot move from pre-conventional to conventional moral reasoning unless and until he or she can think beyond an egocentric perspective and hold multiple perspectives in mind (one's own, the other's, and the needs and rights of the group) while performing mental operations on a moral issue. The final level (post-conventional stages 5 & 6) involves holding a complex array of perspectives and thoughts about right moral action against a universalizable set of moral values and principles. Kohlberg's (1981, 1984, 1987) six stages are defined in Table 5.1.

Overall, Kohlberg's model of moral stage development illustrates the potential evolution of moral reasoning toward greater complexity and adequacy. Moral stages, for Kohlberg, were not simply moral ideals, ideal types, or virtual models of reasoning, but actual cognitive-developmental stages in the evolving structure of the social-moral brain.

The sweeping nature of his approach received academic acclaim and media attention. Scholars, of course, also subjected his work to intense scrutiny, raised several critical questions, and pointed to the need for further research. High-quality empirical studies were then conducted and, eventually, several decisive reviews of the accumulated research studies were published. These reviews provided support for the following conclusions:

(a) *Stage validity.* Moral stages have been shown to be qualitatively different from each other, and internally integrated structured wholes, which change in an invariant sequence, one stage at a time (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Hart, 1992; Kohlberg, 1984; cf. Dawson, 2002). Brain research, using non-invasive functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanners, also has documented that distinct areas of neural activation and distinct modes of neural connectivity differentiate lower *versus* higher moral stage reasoning (cf. Caceda, James, Snarey, & Kilts, 2011; Prehn et al., 2008).

(b) *Cross-cultural universality.* The first four stages are found in virtually all cultural groups, and principled reasoning is found to some degree in all complex societies with elaborated systems of education such as India, Japan, and Taiwan (Snarey, 1985). Although the stage sequence is not altered by diverse cultural context, post-conventional or principled reasoning becomes more pluralistic. Although Kohlberg identified a particular form of post-conventional reasoning that he believed was universal, research among non-Western cultural groups and non-European-American racial-ethnic groups reveals a pluralistic array of genuine ethical principles in addition to those addressed by Kohlberg's theory and scoring manual (cf. Siddle-Walker & Snarey, 2004; Snarey & Keljo, 1991).

Table 5.1 Kohlberg's Six Developmental Stages of Justice Reasoning

Stage 1: Obedience and Punishment Orientation

At Stage 1, what is moral is to avoid breaking rules or to comply for obedience's sake, and to avoid doing physical damage to people or property. Moral judgments are self-evident, requiring little or no justification beyond labeling. A person at Stage 1 does not realize that the interests of others may differ from his or her own. Justice is understood as strict, literal equality, with special needs or mitigating circumstances not understood or taken into consideration. In situations in which an authority is involved, justice is defined as respectful obedience to the authority. The justification for moral action or doing what is right includes avoidance of penalties and the superior power of authorities.

Stage 2: Instrumental Purpose and Exchange

What is moral for the person at Stage 2 is to follow the rules when it is in the person's immediate interest to do so, especially in terms of an equal exchange, a good deal. The person now recognizes that other persons may have other interests. Justice involves relating conflicting individual interests through an instrumental exchange of services or marketplace economy: You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours. The justification for being moral is to serve one's own needs in a world where one must recognize that other people also have their own interests, which may conflict with one's own.

Stage 3: Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Good Relations

A person at Stage 3 is able to coordinate the separate perspectives of individuals into a third-person perspective, which enables interpersonal trust, mutual relationships, loyalty, and shared moral values. What is moral is conforming to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in one's role as son, sister, parent, friend, and so on. Justice now can take into consideration a person's worthiness, goodness, and circumstances. The justifications for acting morally focus on the desire to be seen as a good person in one's own eyes and those of others. One should be caring of others because, if you put yourself in the other person's shoes, you would want good behavior from others.

Stage 4: Social System and Conscience Maintenance

The right thing to do is to be a good citizen, uphold the social order, and maintain the society. What is moral involves fulfilling one's duties. Laws are to be upheld, except in extreme cases in which they conflict with other fixed social duties. Justice centers on the notions of impartiality in application of the law; procedural justice first emerges as a central concern at Stage 4. A just decision also should take into consideration a person's contribution to society. This is a social-maintenance, rather than an interpersonal-maintenance, perspective; being moral involves contributing to one's own society, group, or institution. The justifications for being moral are to keep the institution functioning, to maintain self-respect for having met one's defined obligations, and to avoid setting a socially disruptive precedent.

Stage 5: Prior Rights and Social Contract

What is moral is being aware that many values and rules are relative to one's group and subsuming these culturally relative values under fundamental human rights, such as the rights of life and liberty, which are logically prior to society. The person logically organizes rights and values into hierarchies from most to least fundamental. Such non-relative rights are inviolable and should be built into and upheld by any society. Justice now focuses on human rights or social welfare; due process is also a concern. This is a society-creating rather than a society-maintaining point of view. A social system is understood, ideally, as a social contract freely entered into. A person reasoning at Stage 5 justifies upholding the social contract because it preserves one's own rights and the rights of others, ensures impartiality, and promotes the greatest good for the greatest number.

Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles

Deciding what is moral is guided by universal ethical principles that generate decisions by which human dignity is ensured and persons are treated as ends in themselves rather than simply as means. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such ethical principles. When laws violate these principles, however, one acts in accordance with the principle. Going beyond the importance of a social contract, Stage 6 also focuses on the process by which a social agreement is reached. This is a moral-justice point of view, involving the deliberate use of justice principles, which centers on the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of all human beings as free and equal autonomous persons. The justification for being moral is the belief, as that of a rational person, in the validity of universal moral principles that all humanity should follow, and because one has made a self-conscious commitment to them.

Source: Siddle-Walker & Snarey (2004), pp. 18–19.

(c) *Moral action applicability*. Moral behavior and moral reasoning are positively and significantly associated. In both laboratory and real-life settings, moral reasoning is a significant predictor of moral action, including altruistic behavior, resistance of temptation, and nondelinquency (Blasi, 1980). Persons at higher moral stages, for instance, are significantly more likely to help a stranger who needs medical attention (Kohlberg, 1984). The literature also shows a well-established relation between moral immaturity and delinquency. A nine-year longitudinal and cross-sectional study, for instance, confirms the reciprocal relation between moral immaturity and delinquency—the higher the moral reasoning score, the lower the rate of delinquency (Raaijamkers, Engles, & Hoof, 2005). Of course, although the association between moral reasoning and moral action is positive and significant, many moderating factors affect the relation (cf. Bebeau, 2002; Kohlberg, Ricks, & Snarey, 1984; Palmer, 2003; Thoma, 1994; Thoma, Rest, & Davison, 1991).

(d) *Gender inclusiveness*. Possible gender differences in moral judgment have been a source of continued criticism and controversy. In her book, *In a Different Voice*, Carol Gilligan (1982) was one of the first to suggest that Kohlberg's model of moral development was biased to a more male-oriented morality of justice at the expense of a morality of care and responsibility that better suits female moral perspectives. Some research has shown that women and girls tend to use more care-related concerns in their moral justifications (Garmon, Basinger, Gregg, & Gibbs, 1996; Jaffe & Hyde, 2000). Nevertheless, a substantial body of empirical evidence indicates that the current standardized scoring system contains no significant bias against women (Brabeck & Shore, 2002; Walker, 1984) and that Rest's Defining Issues scoring system shows a very small but stable gender effect that consistently favors women (Thoma, 1986). Many studies show that women as well as men, and girls as well as boys, use Kohlberg's ethic of justice (e.g., Garrod et al., 2003). Furthermore, any developmental differences found are more situational than a reflection of gender differences across the lifespan (Clopton & Sorell, 1993; Ryan, Reynolds, & Reynolds, 2004; Thoma, 1986).

(e) *Care is not reducible to justice*. Carol Gilligan (1982) also identified a moral orientation of care that was qualitatively different from the orientation of justice and rights that dominates Kohlberg's theory. While Kohlberg contended that his model of justice included care, others concluded that Gilligan's view had enlarged the psychological understanding of morality (cf. Brabeck, 1984). A number of studies offer evidence that an ethic of care, while used by both men and women, is inadequately represented in Kohlberg's theory (Gilligan, 1982), hypothetical-dilemma interview method (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), and scoring manual (Walker, 1984). Philosophically, justice and care are equally vital and equally irreducible principles in normative moral values (cf. Blum, 1988; Siddle-Walker & Snarey, 2004). Biologically, neuroscience research had demonstrated overlapping but significantly different brain region activations during the neural processing of care *versus* justice moral sensitivity dilemmas (Robertson et al., 2007; Snarey, 2008). In sum, the ethic of care is a separable ethical voice that cannot be simply reduced to an element of an ethic of justice (cf. Brabeck & Ting, 2000; Jorgensen, 2006; Puka, 1991; Sherblom, 2008).

Kohlberg's stage model, despite a number of necessary qualifications and caveats, remains theoretically forceful and pedagogically useful. It continues to generate innovative, and sometimes ground-breaking, research into the nature of moral thought and action, the causes of delinquency and criminal behavior, our nature as human beings, and the understanding of ourselves as moral agents (cf. Gibbs, 2009; Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, and Snarey, 2007; Parke & Clarke-Stewart, 2010).

Moral Types

Kohlberg (1976) and his colleagues (Schrader, Tappan, Kohlberg, & Armon, 1987; Tappan et al., 1987) recognized that moral development stage scores did not account for some important within-stage variations seen in moral judgment interviews. To address this variation, they incorporated Piaget's view of morality as two forms of moral judgment: heteronymous and autonomous. They initially conceived of heteronomy and autonomy as two substages within each of Kohlberg's six stages (Lapsley, 1996). However, the term "substage" was dropped because research showed that the so-called substages did not meet Piaget's criteria for stages (i.e., there was not an invariant sequence from A to B, nor structured wholes).

Kohlberg then adopted from sociologist Max Weber (1949) the concept of "ideal types," that is, abstractions that define the extreme forms of the possible properties of each stage. More specifically, Kohlberg and colleagues defined heteronomy and autonomy as two subtypes (A or B) that may occur within any stage (e.g., Stage 2A and Stage 2B). These subtypes are defined by variations in the content of moral judgments, including notions of freedom from external constraints, ideas about how human rules and laws are constructed, and issues of who is to be included in the moral domain (Kohlberg, 1984). Moral types are, in essence, a way of accounting for some aspects of a person's reasoning that are overlooked when moral stages are assessed.

Type analysis or scoring focuses primarily on the content of moral reasoning, whereas stage analysis focuses primarily on the cognitive structure of moral reasoning. When interviews are scored for moral type, the content of a person's reasoning is considered. Kohlberg and his colleagues looked for criteria to discern these ideal types in the psychological and philosophical works of Piaget and Immanuel Kant. They derived nine "content themes" and used them to discern the moral type of the subject under examination. In the scoring manual for moral type, these theoretical criteria are translated into coding criteria for each of the three standard interview dilemmas. The unit of analysis for coding the moral types is the individual dilemma as a whole. Moral type scores are calculated on the basis of the data that meet the criteria of the Piagetian and Kantian categories that reflect autonomous reasoning in two out of three moral dilemmas (Schrader et al., 1987). The nine criteria that determine moral type are summarized in Table 5.2.

A six-year longitudinal cross-cultural study (Logan, Snarey, & Schrader, 1990) confirmed Kohlberg's previous longitudinal findings from studies in the United States and Turkey that type B reasoning increased with age. Moreover, the study found that the achievement of type B reasoning was positively and significantly associated with moral stage development; that is, subjects who scored at higher stages were more likely to also use type B reasoning. The longitudinal cross-cultural data, however, also showed a trend of one-time shifts (from type A to type B), after which the type tended to remain stable. Nevertheless, consistent with Kohlberg's conceptualization of moral types, reversals from

type B to type A occurred, and both types of reasoning were used by some subjects at every moral stage represented in their study (Stage 2 to Stages 4/5).

Kohlberg's moral types also proved to be a strong conceptual tool for clarifying how moral reasoning translates into moral action. In a number of studies analyzed (Kohlberg, 1984), subjects with a type B moral orientation were more likely to act in concordance with their moral judgments and values even when those values conflicted with a prevailing rule or authority. This discovery is exemplified by data from 26 students involved in the Milgram (1974) experiment who were given the Moral Judgment Interview. The Milgram experiment, which was described to subjects as testing the effects of punishment on memory, required the subjects to administer an increasingly powerful electric shock to a victim in the event of a wrong answer, even to the point of rendering the victim unconscious. The victim was an actor who was not actually shocked, but the situation appeared very real, and subjects were forced to choose between obeying the authority of the experimenter (dressed in a white lab coat and encouraging the subject to continue administering the "shock") versus discontinuing the suffering of the victim by ceasing to participate in the experiment. None of the participants who had been assessed as moral type A quit, and only 18% of those scored as "ambiguous" ceased participation in the experiment. In contrast, a full 86% of the participants assessed as moral type B quit the experiment regardless of moral stage (Kohlberg, 1984). Kohlberg explained these results by noting that type B reasoning is characterized by a clear conception of the "right" thing to do in a situation (deontic choice) as well as a sense of responsibility to act, born of a fully developed notion of autonomy (freedom to act according to one's own values regardless of what others expect), reversibility (a desire to treat others as one would want to be treated), and universality (that you would expect your action to be "right" in all similar situations). Deontic choice and responsibility are two judgments that mediate moral action, according to Kohlberg (1984).

Table 5.2 Kohlberg's Distinctions Between Type A and Type B Moral Orientations

Criteria	Type A (Heteronomous)	Type B (Autonomous)
Hierarchy	No clear moral hierarchy, reliance on pragmatic and other concerns	Clear hierarchy of moral values; prescriptive duties are primary
Instrinsicality	Instrumental view of persons	Persons as ends in themselves; respect for autonomy, dignity
Prescriptivity	Moral duty as instrumental or hypothetical	Moral duty as moral obligation
Universality	Judgments uncritically assumed to be held by everyone or based on self-interest	Generalized view; applies to everyone in same situation
Freedom	External bases validate judgments	No reliance on external authority or tradition
Mutual respect	Unilateral obedience	Cooperation among equals
Reversibility	Views the dilemma from only one point of view	Understanding of the other's perspective; reciprocity
Constructivism	Rigid view of rules and laws as fixed	Flexible view of rules and laws as adaptable
Choice	Does not choose or justify choice in terms of fairness or justice	Chooses solution generally seen as just or fair

Source: Logan, Snarey & Schrader (1990), p. 75.

In sum, Kohlberg's type categories expanded his stage theory in three respects: (1) moral types primarily address the content of moral reasoning, whereas moral stages focus on the structure of moral reasoning; (2) either type may occur at any stage and at any age in the lifespan, thus accounting for observed within-stage variability (cf. Schraeder et al., 1987); and (3) moral type helps clarify the connection between moral reasoning and moral action.

Moral Atmosphere

Kohlberg (1980, 1985) and colleagues (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989) developed the concept of "moral atmosphere" to refer to a community's shared expectations and normative values. He also referred to the concept as a community's "moral climate" or "moral culture." Kohlberg understood that the group is the primary context for the development of a moral person. At the time when this concept was being developed, his stage theory was being criticized for his emphasis on the individual reasoner and on individual rights, at the expense of the community (cf. Snarey & Keljo, 1991).

Kohlberg's theory of moral atmosphere analysis is a robust answer to his communitarian and Durkheimian critics. Based in part on Durkheim's idea that the group is greater than the sum of its individual members, Kohlberg and his colleagues sought to characterize the added value of groups that would be the most relevant to moral cognition, development, and behavior. Also, drawing on Durkheim's view that the unit of education was the group, Kohlberg concluded that changing the school's moral culture would profoundly affect an individual's moral formation. Kohlberg further specified that the most beneficial group for moral development is a democratically governed group, one that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of each to each other and to the group as a whole. Thus, a simple focus on the developmental promotion of an individual's moral reasoning was not enough; democratic governance would be the kind of collective socialization that would foster moral ideals, goals, and actions as well as promote moral reasoning. In addition, the promotion of moral development had to include the collective socialization of moral content. Kohlberg (1985) came to emphasize that moral development is not only about doing justice; it also includes the social dimension of a person acting in caring relationships with those attached to each other and with the group (cf. McDonough, 2005).

Clark Power and Ann Higgins worked with Kohlberg (1989) to construct an array of complex variables that, taken together, provide a detailed map of a school's moral atmosphere or climate. Three of these variables (levels of institutional valuing, stages of community valuing, and phases of the collective norm) are summarized in Table 5.3. The first two focus on the valuing of the school as a social entity, and the last one focuses on the phases of commitment to the collective norm.

Kohlberg and his colleagues noted that "the two major units in this analysis, the collective norm and the element of institutional value, correspond to two of Durkheim's goals of moral education: discipline and attachment to the group." They continued: "Durkheim's third goal of moral education, autonomy, corresponds most closely to our analysis of the stage of norms and elements" (p. 116). As Kohlberg (1985) states elsewhere, they made use of Durkheim's concept of the "spirit of discipline" as "respect for group norms and rules" and "respect for the group; which makes them" (p. 42), and they made use of his concept of the "spirit of altruism," which arises from attachment to the group, as "the willingness to freely give up the ego's interests, privileges and possessions

Table 5.3 Moral Atmosphere: Levels, Stages, and Phases

Levels of Institutional Valuing	Stages of Community Valuing	Phases of the Collective Norm
Level 0: Rejection The school is not valued.		Phase 0: No collective norm exists or is proposed.
Level 1: Instrumental extrinsic valuing The school is valued as an institution that helps individuals to meet their own needs.		*Collective Norm Proposal* Phase 1: Individuals propose collective norms for group acceptance.
Level 2: Enthusiastic identification The school is valued at special moments when members feel an intense sense of identification with the school.	Stage 2: There is no clear sense of community apart from exchanges among group members. Community denotes a collection of individuals who do favors for each other and rely on each other for protection. Community is valued insofar as it meets the concrete needs of its members.	*Collective Norm Acceptance* Phase 2: Collective norm is accepted as a group ideal but not agreed to. It is not an expectation for behavior. Phase 3: Collective norm is accepted and agreed to, but it is not (yet) an expectation for behavior.
Level 3: Spontaneous community The school is valued as the kind of place in which members feel a sense of closeness to others and an inner motivation to help them and to serve the community as a whole.	Stage 3: The sense of community refers to a set of relationships and sharing among group members. The group is valued for the friendliness of its members. The value of the group is equated with the value of its collective normative expectations.	*Collective Norm Expectation* Phase 4: Collective norm is accepted and expected (naive expectation). Phase 5: Collective norm is expected but not followed (disappointed expectation).
Level 4: Normative community The school as a community is valued for its own sake. Community can obligate its members in special ways, and members can expect others to uphold group norms and responsibilities.	Stage 4: The community is explicitly valued as an entity distinct from the relationships among its members. Community membership is understood in terms of entering into a social contract to respect the norms and ideals of the group. The community is perceived as an organic whole composed of interrelated systems that carry on the functioning of the group.	*Collective Norm Enforcement* Phase 6: Collective norm is expected and upheld through persuasion. Phase 7: Collective norm is expected and upheld through reporting.

Source: Adapted from Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg (1989), pp. 117, 119, 130.

Note

The parallel listing of the three variables is not intended to imply a clear theoretical parallelism between moral atmosphere levels, stages, and phases.

to the group or other members of it" (p. 42). Going beyond Durkheim, however, Kohlberg and colleagues also placed more emphasis on rational "autonomy" to avoid abuses that could result from "immoral use" of the power of the "collectivist model" (1987, p. 116). Furthermore, Kohlberg (1985) supplemented Durkheim's concept of "loyalty" to one's society with "loyalty to universal principles of justice and responsibility as the solution to problems" (p. 41).

The net effect of this work was to broaden Kohlberg's theory to include the concurrent processes of moral judgment development and cultural values socialization, without reducing one to the other. Subsequent empirical research has provided support for the wisdom of this approach (cf. Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999). Within this developmental-socialization approach to morality, Kohlberg employed three distinct pedagogical methods.

KOHLBERG'S THREE METHODS OF MORAL EDUCATION

The center of Kohlberg's identity was that of a moral educator. Kohlberg (1987) understood that what promoted a person's structural changes in moral reasoning was having rich experiences in the social-moral realm. Kohlberg's pedagogical methods of moral education promote learning from interaction with adult role models (moral exemplars), peers and friends (dilemma discussions), and the larger school community (Just Community schools).

Moral Exemplars

The least acknowledged of Kohlberg's methods of moral education is his use of moral exemplars to pedagogically support socialization and promote development. He intuitively understood that observing or learning about those who practiced moral principles was a more direct method of teaching than any theory could hope to attain. Kohlberg often demonstrated stage-level reasoning with concrete examples from moral judgment interviews, thus using moral case examples to teach his moral developmental categories. For advanced stages, he used public moral exemplars to embody the uncommon Stage 5 and the mercurial Stage 6. Kohlberg also saw public moral exemplars as a critical factor in public moral education; through their insights and actions, they "draw" our development toward higher stages of moral reasoning. Kohlberg held up such mature examples as moral exemplars.

In *Essays on Moral Development: The Psychology of Moral Development* (1984, pp. 486–490), Kohlberg and chapter co-author Ann Higgins offered a 32-year-old woman named "Joan" as a moral exemplar. Joan's ability to frame the Heinz dilemma as a dialogue of competing claims and her ability to take the role of each person in the dilemma, in turn, appeared to be an example of post-conventional moral reasoning. This was confirmed for Kohlberg by Joan's life story. Joan worked with juvenile wards of the court for a local judge and allowed one of the wards in her care to escape to a better situation in a halfway house in another state, even to the point of providing her with bus money. This action was a clear violation of her responsibilities as outlined by the law, and Joan lost her job. Joan's words and actions suggest a form of reasoning that posits a universal respect for the rights and dignity of persons regardless of the dictates of the law.

Going beyond the individual case study, Kohlberg often used a "roll call of the saints" rhetorical device to list the names of those whom he saw as moral exemplars. Limiting

our survey to his two-volume collected works on moral philosophy (1981) and moral psychology (1984), there are six separate such lists with a total of nine moral exemplars. Two persons are included in five of his six lists and were otherwise also cited the most frequently in his writings: Martin Luther King, Jr., and Socrates. One person was included in two of the lists: Abraham Lincoln. The remaining six were included in one of the six lists: Roman humanitarian Marcus Aurelius, pediatrician and Nazi resister Janusz Korczak, Lord Chancellor Thomas More, Quaker mental health worker Andrea Simpson, stoic philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and non-violent civil disobedience advocate Henry David Thoreau. Occasionally, Kohlberg spoke of at least three other individuals in such a way as to suggest membership in his pantheon of moral exemplars: "Joan," Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, and Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox.

What made these dozen people worthy of being included in Kohlberg's roll call of moral exemplars and as valuable models for moral educators today? Perhaps most important, in addition to their exemplary moral reasoning and empathic moral emotions, they had taken action to rectify an injustice (e.g., non-violent public dissent, critical speeches, protest marches). These were acts of public moral education. Morality, without works, is dead, Kohlberg seemed to believe. Thus, while Kohlberg admired many philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, Plato, Kant, John Dewey, John Rawls), the only one he elevated to moral sainthood was Socrates. Although he bestows respectful admiration on several theologians (Paul Tillich, Martin Luther King, Jr., Teilhard de Chardin) and four Saints of the Catholic Church (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas More, Saint Paul), Kohlberg only spoke of two of these seven as moral exemplars: Thomas More and Martin Luther King, Jr. While discussing the relation between morality, religion, and a hypothetical Stage 7, Kohlberg acknowledged the work of several well-known and charismatic religious leaders, but he only elevated Spinoza, Marcus Aurelius, Andrea Simpson, and Martin Luther King, Jr. as faith-motivated moral exemplars, which suggests that his positive regard for them had little to do with religious charisma and everything to do with how they lived out their moral principles (cf. Hart & Atkins, 2004).

Finally, Kohlberg always understood that moral exemplars were still flawed human beings and products of their time. For example, one of the central undertakings for many of his exemplars was *moral education against racism* (e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, Jr., Janusz Korczak). Nevertheless, while discussing the Piaget-like phenomena of historical "decalage" on the subject of enlightenment regarding slavery, Kohlberg notes that "Socrates was more accepting of slavery than was Lincoln, who was more accepting of it than did King," who was not accepting of it at all (1981, p. 129). Inevitably, of course, a similar historical partiality was engendered in Kohlberg as a product of his own times. In terms of race and gender, his roll call of exemplars included one black man, two white women, and nine white men. Nevertheless, although he exhibited partiality, his primary criteria for being considered an exemplar for moral education rings true because they lived out their mature moral reasoning and empathy through moral behavior and courageous action that threatened the status quo. Consequently, most faced penalties and some died for their moral stance.

Experienced moral educators know that lecture descriptions of moral stages take on new relevance when illustrated with examples "ripped from the headlines," so to speak, or when a moral exemplar makes a guest visit to a class session to talk about why they care (cf. Vozzola, 1996). Publications on moral exemplars also can be useful in moral education. Colby and Damon (1992) provide portraits of 23 contemporary lives of moral

commitment and courageous leadership. Siddle-Walker and Snarey (2004) make use of six moral exemplars, three children and three adults, who embody African-American care-and-justice ethics.

Dilemma Discussions

About a decade after Kohlberg (1958) proposed his moral stage model, the first genuine Kohlbergian venture into moral education began with an experiment by Kohlberg's doctoral student, Moshe Blatt, who attempted to facilitate moral stage development among sixth-grade students through weekly classroom discussions of hypothetical moral dilemmas (cf. Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). Blatt found that over one-third of the students in the experimental group advanced in stage of moral development during the year, whereas few of the students in a control group exhibited any stage change.

Subsequently, Kohlberg and his colleagues implemented this method by integrating dilemma discussions into the curriculum of school classes on the humanities (e.g., literature) and social studies (e.g., history). To prepare teachers, Kohlberg and colleagues held workshops and wrote about how to lead moral dilemma discussions (e.g., Fenton & Kohlberg, 1976; Kohlberg & Lickona, 1987). Some of the questions were quite similar to those used in a standard moral judgment interview; that is, they asked students to clarify their reasoning about "why" they held a certain position. Other questions asked students to make their meaning clear, ensure a shared understanding, or promote peer interaction, especially perspective-taking (cf. Selman, 1971). Additionally, attention was given to questions designed to promote Socratic discussion. Fritz Oser (1992) advanced a more group-centered method of "discourse ethics" and Georg Lind (2007) attended to the importance of the overall structure and organization of a moral dilemma discussion.

The major assumption of promoting moral dilemma discussions in classrooms and peer groups is that "interactive exchanges with peers" will "speed up the natural development of moral judgment" (Rest & Thoma, 1986, p. 59). Samuelson (2007), for instance, demonstrated that a discussion-based curriculum using film clips containing moral dilemmas from popular Hollywood films produced a statistically significant improvement in the degree to which students endorsed higher stage moral reasoning compared to those who did not participate. Beyond statistical significance, however, Kohlberg asked, how psychologically significant are the gains promoted by participation in dilemma discussions? Subsequent comparison studies of approaches to moral education, and several reviews of moral education research and programs using moral dilemmas, have provided decisive evaluations.

The landmark meta-analysis of 55 studies by Schlaefli, Rest, and Thoma (1985) showed that the dilemma discussion approach produces moderate and significant educational effects on moral development, whereas other types of intervention programs produce smaller effects, and individual academic courses in the humanities produce even weaker effects. Higgins' review (1980) drew similar but more qualitative conclusions.

> The most powerful interventions for stimulating moral stage change are those that involve discussions of real [rather than hypothetical] problems and situations occurring in natural groups, whether the family or classroom in which all participants are empowered to have a say in the discussion.
>
> (p. 96)

This finding should alert teachers and professors that many unexpected critical incidents in teaching involve a real moral dilemma and often provide an opportunity to engage in a real-life moral dilemma discussion.

Dilemma discussions are also used in formal courses on ethics. DeHaan and colleagues (1997) compared the effectiveness of three approaches to ethics education among high school students by enrolling students in one of four high school classes: an introductory ethics class, a blended economics-ethics class, a role-model ethics class taught by graduate students, and a non-ethics comparison class. The first two classes used dilemma discussions, and all groups were assessed with pre- and post-test measures of moral reasoning, moral emotions, and moral behavior. The clearest positive pattern evident in the data was that the integrated economics-ethics class and the introductory ethics class showed statistically significant gains in socio-moral reflection maturity, principled moral reasoning, and moral behavior. Similar students in the comparison group and the role-model ethics class showed no such advances. These findings again suggest that high school students have the most to gain when teachers explicitly draw their students' attention to the ethical issues inherent in their respective courses and integrate the discussion of relevant moral dilemmas into their current courses.

It is not just the method or experience of moral dilemma discussion that has an impact on its efficacy in moral development, but also the peer context. Kohlberg hypothesized that the ideal situation for advancement in moral reasoning was to be involved in a discussion with another person who reasoned at a level one stage higher (+1) than one's own level. Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) engaged a group whose participants expressed reasoning at various levels in a dilemma discussion. The experimenter then chose the argument that was one stage above the level of most of the participants and supported it, emphasizing its strengths and encouraging participants to engage in thinking along these lines. This method led to significant increases in moral maturity scores. In a review of the effectiveness of moral development interventions using the plus-one strategy with moral dilemma discussions, Enright, Lapsley, Harris, and Schawver (2001) established that most (10 of 13 interventions) produced significant gains in moral reasoning. Those interventions in which a significant difference did not occur tended to be of shorter duration (e.g., one to six sessions). Although the plus-one strategy has good support in the literature, other strategies have also proven effective. Walker's (1982) study of middle school students found a significant effect on moral reasoning with exposure to persons who reasoned two stages above the subjects, whereas Berkowitz, Gibbs, and Broughton's (1980) study of college students found the ideal stage differential was at a third (+1/3) of a stage for dialogues between two peers. Overall, these studies support the general concept of the "zone of proximal development" that posits that children learn best from a person who performs at one level just above the child's level (Walker & Taylor, 1991).

Although most studies of moral development interventions take place in the school setting, much of a child's moral development takes place at home. Walker and Taylor (1991) investigated the role of dilemma discussions between parent and child. They showed that children with significant gains in moral reasoning over time had parents that adjusted their level of moral reasoning to fit the child's. In other words, it is not high moral reasoning in parents that predicts change in the child; rather it is parents who can accommodate their reasoning to the child's level who will have the most effect. They also found that hypothetical dilemmas were not predictive of children's subsequent moral development, but that "real-life" moral dilemmas from the experience of the child had

the greatest impact, supporting Higgins' (1980) prior conclusion. Moreover, Walker and Taylor found that the most effective type of communication in moral dilemma discussions was representational, which included such behaviors as restating the child's reasoning, asking for the child's opinion, asking questions of clarification, and checking for understanding. This, combined with presentation of moral reasoning at approximately one stage above the child's pre-intervention stage score, predicted the greatest gains in the child's moral reasoning.

Ann Kruger (1992, 1993), like Piaget, reasoned that the greater symmetry of knowledge and power in the peer dyads compared to the adult/child dyads produced the freedom to entertain multiple perspectives, which resulted in measurable development in moral reasoning. Kruger's (1992) investigation of moral dilemmas included young girls' discussions both with their peers and with their mothers. She showed that peer discussions of moral dilemmas result in greater improvement in moral reasoning than do discussions between children and adults.

From these studies we can draw several conclusions:

1. Dilemma discussion is a useful method for moral development education.
2. Real-life dilemmas, perhaps especially those drawn from personal experience, are more efficacious for moral development than are hypothetical dilemmas.
3. There is a zone of proximal development in which dilemma discussions will most advance moral development.
4. Peers are the best teachers or conversation partners. Dilemma or problem-situation based discussions continue to be the most widely used method of moral education today.

Just Community Schools

In 1973, Kohlberg's thinking about moral education within schools broke new ground when he recognized a limitation of the moral dilemma discussion method. Although it can change students (slowly), it does not take into account the moral atmosphere of the social context. As Kohlberg put it, the school is a context "in which one cannot wait until children reach [Stage 5 of moral development] to deal directly with moral behavior" (1978, p. 15). However, Kohlberg now faced a pedagogical dilemma: how to teach moral values without imposing them on children or compromising their moral autonomy. In addition, because children often reason within one stage of each other and their interaction provides optimal opportunities to advance moral reasoning, the dilemma then becomes how to help children teach each other universal moral values.

Kohlberg had theorized that this dilemma was solvable because the end principles found in higher stages (4, 5, and 6) of reasoning, such as reciprocity, respect, and justice, were present in some elementary form from Stage 1 onwards (Kohlberg, 1980). His plan for developing children's moral maturity was for the teacher to promote the development of the children's native sense of fairness and, in so doing, prepare them to better understand and then appropriate the principle of justice toward which moral development reaches. The goal was to achieve a "balance [of] 'justice' and 'community'; to introduce the powerful appeal of the collective while both protecting the rights of individual students and promoting their moral growth" (Power et al., 1989, p. 53). His bold and daring approach was deceptively simple—a return to the progressive ideal of educational democracy but within a communitarian mode (cf. Dewey, 1916).

Kohlberg founded the first Just Community school in the spring of 1974. He had received funding to train high school teachers in developmental moral education. At the same time in the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, plans for a new alternative high school were under way and Kohlberg was invited to consult in its planning. Students, parents, teachers, and Kohlberg met together to design the new school. The end result was the Cluster School, which was governed by the following principles:

1. The school would be governed by direct democracy. All major issues would be discussed and decided at a weekly community meeting at which all members (students and teachers) would have one vote.
2. There would be, in addition, a number of standing committees to be filled by students, teachers, and parents.
3. A social contract would be drawn between members which would define everyone's rights and responsibilities.
4. Students and teachers would have the same basic rights, including freedom of expression, respect of others, and freedom from physical or verbal harm.

The keystone of the Just Community approach was the weekly community meeting (aka, Town Meeting), a gathering of students and staff to decide school policies and practices that dealt with issues of fairness and community. The advisor and standing committee groups met on the day before the community meeting. Each advisory group consisted of one of the five teachers and a fifth of the students. These small group meetings set the stage for the larger community meetings as well as provided an opportunity for students and their advisors to get to know each other and share more personal concerns than could be dealt with in the larger meeting. The agenda for the community meeting would be discussed, and the small group would often debate the issues and try to achieve consensus or agreement on majority and minority proposals to bring to the next day's meeting.

All of these meetings functioned as a context for moral discussion and a place to build community. The general aim was for students to achieve a sense of community solidarity—to create a "moral atmosphere"—through the practice of democratic governance (i.e., coming to fair decisions, carrying out these decisions, and, as necessary, to democratically changing their decisions). One aspect of the Just Community educator's role was similar to that of a youth leader, that is, to function both as a socializer, in the manner of Durkheim, and as a facilitator, in the manner of Piaget. The sense of group solidarity allowed the peer group to function as a moral authority for its members' behavior. Direct participatory democracy, furthermore, functions to protect the rights of the student and to limit the power of group solidarity to coerce conformity, in order to maintain the possibility for alternative conceptions of the good to be voiced.

The role of the teacher was perhaps as important as the students' peers. In typical moral dilemma discussions in a regular classroom, teachers primarily functioned as facilitators, but in the new Just Community schools, teachers also had to function as advocates for moral content: justice and community values (Kohlberg & Selman, 1972; Selman, 2003). Thus, the teachers served as moral leaders by advocating their own positions within the constraints of one person, one vote, and by being invested in "what" students decided to do and "why" they decided to do it (Oser & Renold, 2006).

Later Kohlberg and his colleagues applied the Just Community approach at the suburban Scarsdale Alternative High School in Westchester County, New York, an upper- and upper-middle-class school and at the Brookline High School, Brookline, Massachusetts, a semi-urban middle-class school-within-a-school (cf. Mosher, Kenny, & Garrod, 1994). Finally, toward the end of his life, Kohlberg and his colleagues implemented three Just Community programs in New York City; two in one of the five worst city schools and one in an examination school with high-performing students (see Higgins, 1989). Several other schools have adopted the principles of Just Community schools, at least in part, in order to promote moral development (see Howard-Hamilton, 1995).

Reactions to the idea of "the adolescent as citizen" often create the same initial response as the idea of "the child as philosopher." What "kind of quixotic oxymoron" is this? (Mosher, 1992, p. 179). Educational researchers also have asked; does Kohlberg's Just Community approach actually promote the moral reasoning of students and the moral atmosphere of schools? The answer is a qualified "yes," based on a comparative analysis of the first three Just Community schools (cf. Mosher et al., 1994; Power et al., 1989). The students in each of the three Just Community schools (i.e., Cambridge, Brookline, and Scarsdale) scored significantly higher than their contemporaries attending the parallel or parent high schools on all measures of moral atmosphere, including the level of institutional valuing, stage of community valuing, and phase of collective norm. The results on individual moral judgment were also in the expected direction; the average moral stage scores for the students in the Just Community programs were significantly higher than for the students in their companion traditional high schools. The stage gains were smaller than expected, but still respectable (i.e., at two- and three-year longitudinal follow-up interviews, students at the Cluster School showed that they gained, on average, about a half-stage in moral development). It is also noteworthy that the evaluation studies found no statistically significant gender differences in any of the analyses of moral culture or moral stage variables. Nevertheless, it also is clear that future Just Community interventions need to provide for a greater degree of culturally sensitive adaptation and cultural responsiveness when approaching cross-class, cross-race, or cross-cultural school settings, each with its own distinctive sociocultural history, strengths, and needs (cf. Nucci, 2001; Vozzola & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2000). At the minimum, as Noddings (1992) has noted, "we respond most effectively [as caring persons] when we understand the other's needs and the history of this need" (p. 23).

In sum, the net effect of the Just Community model of moral education was to extend Kohlberg's theory from the moral reasoning of individuals to the moral culture of communities (cf. Oser, Althof, & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2008). Kohlberg's Just Community approach to moral education incorporates both socialization and developmental perspectives and provides a way for teachers and administrators to embody justice and care in their treatment of students and each other and a way for students to develop these moral values. In the end, the Just Community approach also expanded our understanding of conventional moral reasoning (stages 3 and 4). Students reasoning at so-called conformist levels were shown to be able to "understand moral concepts" in ways that allow them to "scrutinize, critique, resist, or attempt to change the practices, laws, or arrangements of their" high school society (Turiel, 2002, p. 105).

WHAT KOHLBERG TAUGHT US

Kohlberg opened the eyes of psychologists and educators to the fact that people's moral thinking changes as they mature, and that these changes follow predictable stages of development as they grow older. While his stage model is one of his greatest contributions to moral psychology, Kohlberg also contributed models of moral types, as well as moral cultural atmosphere levels, which have made the picture of human moral development more complete. Kohlberg's models of moral development, alone, would have been a remarkable achievement. But he was, at heart, a dedicated educator, committed to seeing theory bear fruit, and so he developed methods of moral education that would promote moral development and mature character. Kohlberg's three-pronged approach to moral education—moral exemplars, moral dilemma discussions, and Just Community schools—collectively transcend the dichotomy of socialization versus development. His groundbreaking approach to moral education, similarly, taught that we must pay equal and concurrent attention to the moral reasoning development of the individual and the moral cultural development of the community. Both play equally important roles in the development of morality.

Additionally, Kohlberg demonstrated a genuine interest in views of his critics and a willingness to engage new approaches to moral cognition, development, and education. His example remains especially relevant today because the cognitive-developmental tradition is currently characterized by a spirit of revisionism. This pluralism is to be valued because we now understand that "moral functioning is inherently multifaceted" (Walker, 2004, p. 547). Taking our cue from Kohlberg's openness, it is likely that we have much to gain from positive engagement with ongoing constructive critiques of the cognitive-developmental tradition. Many of the critics began their theoretical work during Kohlberg's lifetime (1927–1987) but, during the post-Kohlberg decades, theoretical innovations accelerated, alternative measures of theoretical constructs were perfected, and corresponding methods of moral education have been constructed (cf. Arnold, 2000). A number of these alternatives and innovations are reflected in the chapters in this handbook. These innovations demonstrate the field's current spirit of expansion and pluralistic revisionism. Kohlberg would be the first to remind us, of course, that there is room at the table for everyone.

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