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## LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS

### *Moral Education in the Cognitive-Developmental Tradition*

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#### INTRODUCTION

Lawrence Kohlberg's ideas about moral formation and moral education were revolutionary. He made morality a central concern in psychology, and he remains the person most often identified as a founding figure in the field of moral psychology, including moral development and moral education. He understood that children and adolescents, as well as adults, are *developing* moral philosophers, capable of forming their own moral judgments and capable of revising them. Kohlberg is best known for his three models of moral formation (moral stages, types, and atmosphere) and his three methods of moral education (moral exemplars, dilemma discussions, and Just Community schools). Overall, Kohlberg created lasting frameworks for approaching the study of moral cognition and development and inspired educational programs to prepare citizens for living in a participatory democracy.

Kohlberg (1958, 1969), like all revolutionary thinkers, also stands on the shoulders of his predecessors. Kohlberg's approach to moral education is rooted in the theories and methods of Jean Piaget (1896–1980) and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917). The ideas of these two giants in the field of moral development and education are also evident in contemporary approaches to moral and character education. The approach most influenced by Piaget is often called Moral Education. It emphasizes that students participate in moral thought and action through moral dilemma discussions, role-play, collaborative peer interaction, and a democratic classroom and school culture. Another approach more influenced by Durkheim is often called Character Education. It emphasizes the direct teaching of virtues and exemplary character traits, role modeling, and reinforcement of good behavior (Althof & Berkowitz, 2006; Berkowitz, 2012). Kohlberg draws creatively from both traditions in fashioning his approach to moral development and education.

### PIAGET'S COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

Piaget viewed the development of morality through the lens of his “cognitive-developmental” theory. In this view, a series of organized cognitive structures that govern a child’s thoughts and actions are transformed in an ordered sequence as the child constructs, through interaction with the environment, increasingly useful and more complex cognitive operations. In *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, Piaget (1932) distinguished two types of moral reasoning, each of which shows a different understanding of respect, fairness, and punishment:

1. *Heteronomous morality*. Initially morality is based on unilateral respect for authorities and the rules they prescribe. Fairness is understood as obedience to authorities and conformity to their “sacred” rules; consequences are understood as concrete, objective damage, which carries more weight than intentions; expiatory punishment is the favored way of making things right.
2. *Autonomous morality*. Morality is based on mutual respect, reciprocity, and equality among peers. Fairness is understood as mutually agreed upon cooperation and reciprocal exchange. Intentionality is understood as relevant; both intentions and consequences can be kept in mind concurrently; punishment by reciprocity is favored.

Piaget saw moral development as the movement from heteronomous morality to autonomous morality and believed that social interactions, especially with peers, would fuel moral development.

Piaget was a strong advocate of democratic educational methods and critiqued what he believed to be Durkheim’s position on this point:

The problem is to know what will best prepare the child for its future task of citizenship.... For ourselves we regard as of the utmost importance the experiments that have been made to introduce democratic methods into schools. We therefore do not at all agree with Durkheim in thinking that it is the master’s business to impose or even to “reveal” rules to the child.

(1932, pp. 363–364)

Piaget claimed that educators best promote mature moral reasoning by talking with children as equals in the search for knowledge rather than with indoctrinative authority that promotes the consolidation of childish reasoning. Piaget considered his moral development approach to be the “opposite pole from the Durkheimian pedagogy” (1932, p. 362).

### DURKHEIM'S CULTURAL SOCIALIZATION APPROACH

Durkheim’s core principles are laid out in his 1902 and 1903 lecture series, published posthumously as *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education* (1925). At the center of Durkheim’s approach is collective socialization or cultural transmission, which is the process whereby a person learns society’s norms and expectations through instruction and explanation, role models, and group

reinforcement. Therefore, education for moral character is primarily about social solidarity, group conformity, and mutual support.

Durkheim maintained that social norms were the most effective means of control, not because they are socially imposed from the outside, but because they are voluntarily internalized and come to function as the society's norms living within its members. He posited three elements of morality:

*Spirit of discipline.* Morality requires respect for social norms and authority and consistent conduct.

*Spirit of altruism.* Morality requires that persons be attached to and identified with social groups.

*Autonomy or self-determination.* Though the society is the final authority for the child, the child must freely choose whether to follow the society's rules.

Durkheim held that collective responsibility, applied with restraint and judgment, is central to moral education. Thus, in the practice of moral education, the school has a crucial and clearly specified function: **to create a new being shaped according to the needs of society.** Kohlberg, influenced by Piaget's writings on Durkheim, originally saw striking limitations to this method and derisively labeled contemporary attempts at moral socialization as a "bag of virtues" approach:

Although it may be true that the notion of teaching virtues, such as honesty or integrity, arouses little controversy, it is also true that vague consensus on the goodness of these virtues conceals a great deal of actual disagreement over their definitions. What is one person's "integrity" is another person's "stubbornness," what is one person's honesty in "expressing your true feelings" is another person's insensitivity to the feelings of others.

(Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 9–10)

Kohlberg believed that an enculturation approach leaves one open to ethical relativity, and he did not want to base his approach on socially relative virtues.

**Kohlberg eventually realized that Piaget had attacked something of a caricature of Durkheim.** Both Piaget and Durkheim agreed, for instance, that moral behavior entails cognitive understanding and the exercise of free will, not just imitating role models or ideals of virtue. As Durkheim was careful to indicate, "To teach morality is neither to preach nor to indoctrinate; it is to explain" (1925, p. 20). Beyond their shared belief in the egoism of the child, both also stressed the importance of groups' social relations for the child's development, and that morality is formed in the context of relationships and role taking experiences (cf. Selman, 1971, 2003). Finally, both viewed a school's classroom dynamics and authority structure as inevitably involved in moral education (cf. Power, 2004).

## **KOHLBERG'S REFINED DEVELOPMENTAL-SOCIALIZATION APPROACH**

Kohlberg's work is primarily identified with the "cognitive-developmental paradigm." His stage theory of moral development, like Piaget's, postulates that moral reasoning

proceeds through an invariant sequence of stages toward an increasingly adequate understanding of what is just or fair. In this view, the child is a philosopher who actively constructs and makes sense of his or her world. The educator's aim is to provide the conditions that promote the natural progression of moral judgment by providing ethically enriched and stimulating educational experiences within which a child is allowed to exercise moral choice. Motivated by insights gained during educational efforts, Kohlberg reread and reconsidered Durkheim. He came to see that the unit of education was the group, not simply the individual, and that moral education should change a school's moral culture, not only develop a person's moral reasoning. In one of his first public statements of his revised perspective, Kohlberg said:

It is not a sufficient guide to the moral educator, who deals with concrete morality in a school world in which value content as well as structure, behavior as well as reasoning, must be dealt with. In this context, an educator must be a socializer, teaching value content and behavior, not merely a Socratic or Rogerian process-facilitator of development. In becoming a socializer and advocate, the teacher moves into "indoctrination," a step that I originally believed to be invalid ... I no longer hold these negative views of indoctrinative moral education. ... Now I believe that moral education can be in the form of advocacy or "indoctrination" without violating the child's rights if there is an explicit recognition of shared rights of teachers and students and as long as teacher advocacy is democratic, or subject to the constraints of recognizing student participation in the rule-making and value-upholding process.

(1978, pp. 14–15)

Moral development and education, thus revised, involve a synthesis of both the democratic socialization of moral content and the developmental promotion of moral reasoning. By democratizing Durkheim, Kohlberg hoped to give priority to the power of the collective in a way that also protected the rights of the individual. These two concepts—the cognitive-developmental promotion of moral reasoning and the collective socialization of moral content—form the foundation on which Kohlberg constructed his three models of moral cognition and his three approaches to moral education.

### **KOHLBERG'S THREE MODELS OF MORAL COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT**

Kohlberg is renowned for his stage model of moral development. Though his basic stage theory had changed little since its inception in his dissertation study (1958, 2008), Kohlberg augmented it with two additional models. Thus, within the paradigm of structuralism, Kohlberg actually created three models: (1) moral stages, (2) moral types, and (3) social-moral atmosphere levels. Together, they provide a fairly comprehensive view of human moral cognition and development.

#### *Moral Stages*

Kohlberg believed that moral judgment development progressed through six stages: cognitively structured moral reasoning steps that follow an invariant sequence. What drives moral development is the adequacy or inadequacy of moral thought structures in making sense of experience. The human mind assimilates the environment to existing thought

structures and, when this assimilation fails, accommodates by modifying them to more adequately make sense of environmental moral issues. Kohlberg used moral dilemma interviews as his research tool; he presented the equivalent of nine dilemmas to a cohort of 84 adolescent boys and then studied how they reasoned about the dilemmas.

Whereas Piaget primarily saw two thought structures in moral reasoning (outlined above), Kohlberg believed that six age-related thought structures best described his subject's reasoning about the dilemmas. In the moral realm, that is, a person progresses from focusing on the self, in which he or she tries to avoid punishment or maximize gains (pre-conventional stages 1 & 2), to include the perspective of those in close relation to himself or herself, which will eventually include whole systems of relationships expressed in groups, institutions, and society as a whole (conventional stages 3 & 4). According to Kohlberg, a person cannot move from pre-conventional to conventional moral reasoning unless and until he or she can think beyond an egocentric perspective and hold multiple perspectives in mind (one's own, the other's, and the needs and rights of the group) while performing mental operations on a moral issue. The final level (post-conventional stages 5 & 6) involves holding a complex array of perspectives and thoughts about right moral action against a universalizable set of moral values and principles. Kohlberg's (1981, 1984, 1987) six stages are defined in Table 5.1.

Overall, Kohlberg's model of moral stage development illustrates the potential evolution of moral reasoning toward greater complexity and adequacy. Moral stages, for Kohlberg, were not simply moral ideals, ideal types, or virtual models of reasoning, but actual cognitive-developmental stages in the evolving structure of the social-moral brain.

The sweeping nature of his approach received academic acclaim and media attention. Scholars, of course, also subjected his work to intense scrutiny, raised several critical questions, and pointed to the need for further research. High-quality empirical studies were then conducted and, eventually, several decisive reviews of the accumulated research studies were published. These reviews provided support for the following conclusions:

- (a) *Stage validity.* Moral stages have been shown to be qualitatively different from each other, and internally integrated structured wholes, which change in an invariant sequence, one stage at a time (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Hart, 1992; Kohlberg, 1984; cf. Dawson, 2002). Brain research, using non-invasive functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanners, also has documented that distinct areas of neural activation and distinct modes of neural connectivity differentiate lower *versus* higher moral stage reasoning (cf. Caceda, James, Snarey, & Kilts, 2011; Prehn et al., 2008).
- (b) *Cross-cultural universality.* The first four stages are found in virtually all cultural groups, and principled reasoning is found to some degree in all complex societies with elaborated systems of education such as India, Japan, and Taiwan (Snarey, 1985). Although the stage sequence is not altered by diverse cultural context, post-conventional or principled reasoning becomes more pluralistic. Although Kohlberg identified a particular form of post-conventional reasoning that he believed was universal, research among non-Western cultural groups and non-European-American racial-ethnic groups reveals a pluralistic array of genuine ethical principles in addition to those addressed by Kohlberg's theory and scoring manual (cf. Siddle-Walker & Snarey, 2004; Snarey & Keljo, 1991).

**Table 5.1** Kohlberg's Six Developmental Stages of Justice Reasoning

**Stage 1: Obedience and Punishment Orientation**

At Stage 1, what is moral is to avoid breaking rules or to comply for obedience's sake, and to avoid doing physical damage to people or property. Moral judgments are self-evident, requiring little or no justification beyond labeling. A person at Stage 1 does not realize that the interests of others may differ from his or her own. Justice is understood as strict, literal equality, with special needs or mitigating circumstances not understood or taken into consideration. In situations in which an authority is involved, justice is defined as respectful obedience to the authority. The justification for moral action or doing what is right includes avoidance of penalties and the superior power of authorities.

**Stage 2: Instrumental Purpose and Exchange**

What is moral for the person at Stage 2 is to follow the rules when it is in the person's immediate interest to do so, especially in terms of an equal exchange, a good deal. The person now recognizes that other persons may have other interests. Justice involves relating conflicting individual interests through an instrumental exchange of services or marketplace economy: You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours. The justification for being moral is to serve one's own needs in a world where one must recognize that other people also have their own interests, which may conflict with one's own.

**Stage 3: Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Good Relations**

A person at Stage 3 is able to coordinate the separate perspectives of individuals into a third-person perspective, which enables interpersonal trust, mutual relationships, loyalty, and shared moral values. What is moral is conforming to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in one's role as son, sister, parent, friend, and so on. Justice now can take into consideration a person's worthiness, goodness, and circumstances. The justifications for acting morally focus on the desire to be seen as a good person in one's own eyes and those of others. One should be caring of others because, if you put yourself in the other person's shoes, you would want good behavior from others.

**Stage 4: Social System and Conscience Maintenance**

The right thing to do is to be a good citizen, uphold the social order, and maintain the society. What is moral involves fulfilling one's duties. Laws are to be upheld, except in extreme cases in which they conflict with other fixed social duties. Justice centers on the notions of impartiality in application of the law; procedural justice first emerges as a central concern at Stage 4. A just decision also should take into consideration a person's contribution to society. This is a social-maintenance, rather than an interpersonal-maintenance, perspective; being moral involves contributing to one's own society, group, or institution. The justifications for being moral are to keep the institution functioning, to maintain self-respect for having met one's defined obligations, and to avoid setting a socially disruptive precedent.

### **Stage 5: Prior Rights and Social Contract**

What is moral is being aware that many values and rules are relative to one's group and subsuming these culturally relative values under fundamental human rights, such as the rights of life and liberty, which are logically prior to society. The person logically organizes rights and values into hierarchies from most to least fundamental. Such non-relative rights are inviolable and should be built into and upheld by any society. Justice now focuses on human rights or social welfare; due process is also a concern. This is a society-creating rather than a society-maintaining point of view. A social system is understood, ideally, as a social contract freely entered into. A person reasoning at Stage 5 justifies upholding the social contract because it preserves one's own rights and the rights of others, ensures impartiality, and promotes the greatest good for the greatest number.

### **Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles**

Deciding what is moral is guided by universal ethical principles that generate decisions by which human dignity is ensured and persons are treated as ends in themselves rather than simply as means. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such ethical principles. When laws violate these principles, however, one acts in accordance with the principle. Going beyond the importance of a social contract, Stage 6 also focuses on the process by which a social agreement is reached. This is a moral-justice point of view, involving the deliberate use of justice principles, which centers on the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of all human beings as free and equal autonomous persons. The justification for being moral is the belief, as that of a rational person, in the validity of universal moral principles that all humanity should follow, and because one has made a self-conscious commitment to them.

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Source: Siddle-Walker & Snarey (2004), pp. 18–19.

- (c) *Moral action applicability.* Moral behavior and moral reasoning are positively and significantly associated. In both laboratory and real-life settings, moral reasoning is a significant predictor of moral action, including altruistic behavior, resistance of temptation, and nondelinquency (Blasi, 1980). Persons at higher moral stages, for instance, are significantly more likely to help a stranger who needs medical attention (Kohlberg, 1984). The literature also shows a well-established relation between moral immaturity and delinquency. A nine-year longitudinal and cross-sectional study, for instance, confirms the reciprocal relation between moral immaturity and delinquency—the higher the moral reasoning score, the lower the rate of delinquency (Raaijmakers, Engles, & Hoof, 2005). Of course, although the association between moral reasoning and moral action is positive and significant, many moderating factors affect the relation (cf. Bebeau, 2002; Kohlberg, Ricks, & Snarey, 1984; Palmer, 2003; Thoma, 1994; Thoma, Rest, & Davison, 1991).
- (d) *Gender inclusiveness.* Possible gender differences in moral judgment have been a source of continued criticism and controversy. In her book, *In a Different Voice*, Carol Gilligan (1982) was one of the first to suggest that Kohlberg's model of moral development was biased to a more male-oriented morality of justice at the expense of a morality of care and responsibility that better suits female moral perspectives. Some research has shown that women and girls tend to use more care-related concerns in their moral justifications (Garmon, Basinger, Gregg, & Gibbs, 1996; Jaffe & Hyde, 2000). Nevertheless, a substantial body of empirical evidence indicates that the current standardized scoring system contains no significant bias against women (Brabeck & Shore, 2002; Walker, 1984) and that Rest's Defining Issues scoring system shows a very small but stable gender effect that consistently favors women (Thoma, 1986). Many studies show that women as well as men, and girls as well as boys, use Kohlberg's ethic of justice (e.g., Garrod et al., 2003). Furthermore, any developmental differences found are more situational than a reflection of gender differences across the lifespan (Clopton & Sorell, 1993; Ryan, Reynolds, & Reynolds, 2004; Thoma, 1986).
- (e) *Care is not reducible to justice.* Carol Gilligan (1982) also identified a moral orientation of care that was qualitatively different from the orientation of justice and rights that dominates Kohlberg's theory. While Kohlberg contended that his model of justice included care, others concluded that Gilligan's view had enlarged the psychological understanding of morality (cf. Brabeck, 1984). A number of studies offer evidence that an ethic of care, while used by both men and women, is inadequately represented in Kohlberg's theory (Gilligan, 1982), hypothetical-dilemma interview method (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), and scoring manual (Walker, 1984). Philosophically, justice and care are equally vital and equally irreducible principles in normative moral values (cf. Blum, 1988; Siddie-Walker & Snarey, 2004). Biologically, neuroscience research had demonstrated overlapping but significantly different brain region activations during the neural processing of care *versus* justice moral sensitivity dilemmas (Robertson et al., 2007; Snarey, 2008). In sum, the ethic of care is a separable ethical voice that cannot be simply reduced to an element of an ethic of justice (cf. Brabeck & Ting, 2000; Jorgensen, 2006; Puka, 1991; Sherblom, 2008).



Kohlberg's stage model, despite a number of necessary qualifications and caveats, remains theoretically forceful and pedagogically useful. It continues to generate innovative, and sometimes ground-breaking, research into the nature of moral thought and action, the causes of delinquency and criminal behavior, our nature as human beings, and the understanding of ourselves as moral agents (cf. Gibbs, 2009; Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, and Snarey, 2007; Parke & Clarke-Stewart, 2010).

### *Moral Types*

Kohlberg (1976) and his colleagues (Schrader, Tappan, Kohlberg, & Armon, 1987; Tappan et al., 1987) recognized that moral development stage scores did not account for some important within-stage variations seen in moral judgment interviews. To address this variation, they incorporated Piaget's view of morality as two forms of moral judgment: heteronomous and autonomous. They initially conceived of heteronomy and autonomy as two substages within each of Kohlberg's six stages (Lapsley, 1996). However, the term "substage" was dropped because research showed that the so-called substages did not meet Piaget's criteria for stages (i.e., there was not an invariant sequence from A to B, nor structured wholes).

Kohlberg then adopted from sociologist Max Weber (1949) the concept of "ideal types," that is, abstractions that define the extreme forms of the possible properties of each stage. More specifically, Kohlberg and colleagues defined heteronomy and autonomy as two subtypes (A or B) that may occur within any stage (e.g., Stage 2A and Stage 2B). These subtypes are defined by variations in the content of moral judgments, including notions of freedom from external constraints, ideas about how human rules and laws are constructed, and issues of who is to be included in the moral domain (Kohlberg, 1984). Moral types are, in essence, a way of accounting for some aspects of a person's reasoning that are overlooked when moral stages are assessed.

Type analysis or scoring focuses primarily on the content of moral reasoning, whereas stage analysis focuses primarily on the cognitive structure of moral reasoning. When interviews are scored for moral type, the content of a person's reasoning is considered. Kohlberg and his colleagues looked for criteria to discern these ideal types in the psychological and philosophical works of Piaget and Immanuel Kant. They derived nine "content themes" and used them to discern the moral type of the subject under examination. In the scoring manual for moral type, these theoretical criteria are translated into coding criteria for each of the three standard interview dilemmas. The unit of analysis for coding the moral types is the individual dilemma as a whole. Moral type scores are calculated on the basis of the data that meet the criteria of the Piagetian and Kantian categories that reflect autonomous reasoning in two out of three moral dilemmas (Schrader et al., 1987). The nine criteria that determine moral type are summarized in Table 5.2.

A six-year longitudinal cross-cultural study (Logan, Snarey, & Schrader, 1990) confirmed Kohlberg's previous longitudinal findings from studies in the United States and Turkey that type B reasoning increased with age. Moreover, the study found that the achievement of type B reasoning was positively and significantly associated with moral stage development; that is, subjects who scored at higher stages were more likely to also use type B reasoning. The longitudinal cross-cultural data, however, also showed a trend of one-time shifts (from type A to type B), after which the type tended to remain stable. Nevertheless, consistent with Kohlberg's conceptualization of moral types, reversals from

type B to type A occurred, and both types of reasoning were used by some subjects at every moral stage represented in their study (Stage 2 to Stages 4/5).

Kohlberg's moral types also proved to be a strong conceptual tool for clarifying how moral reasoning translates into moral action. In a number of studies analyzed (Kohlberg, 1984), subjects with a type B moral orientation were more likely to act in concordance with their moral judgments and values even when those values conflicted with a prevailing rule or authority. This discovery is exemplified by data from 26 students involved in the Milgram (1974) experiment who were given the Moral Judgment Interview. The Milgram experiment, which was described to subjects as testing the effects of punishment on memory, required the subjects to administer an increasingly powerful electric shock to a victim in the event of a wrong answer, even to the point of rendering the victim unconscious. The victim was an actor who was not actually shocked, but the situation appeared very real, and subjects were forced to choose between obeying the authority of the experimenter (dressed in a white lab coat and encouraging the subject to continue administering the "shock") versus discontinuing the suffering of the victim by ceasing to participate in the experiment. None of the participants who had been assessed as moral type A quit, and only 18% of those scored as "ambiguous" ceased participation in the experiment. In contrast, a full 86% of the participants assessed as moral type B quit the experiment regardless of moral stage (Kohlberg, 1984). Kohlberg explained these results by noting that type B reasoning is characterized by a clear conception of the "right" thing to do in a situation (deontic choice) as well as a sense of responsibility to act, born of a fully developed notion of autonomy (freedom to act according to one's own values regardless of what others expect), reversibility (a desire to treat others as one would want to be treated), and universality (that you would expect your action to be "right" in all similar situations). Deontic choice and responsibility are two judgments that mediate moral action, according to Kohlberg (1984).

**Table 5.2** Kohlberg's Distinctions Between Type A and Type B Moral Orientations

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Type A (Heteronomous)</i>	<i>Type B (Autonomous)</i>
Hierarchy	No clear moral hierarchy, reliance on pragmatic and other concerns	Clear hierarchy of moral values; prescriptive duties are primary
Intrinsicity	Instrumental view of persons	Persons as ends in themselves; respect for autonomy, dignity
Prescriptivity	Moral duty as instrumental or hypothetical	Moral duty as moral obligation
Universality	Judgments uncritically assumed to be held by everyone or based on self-interest	Generalized view; applies to everyone in same situation
Freedom	External bases validate judgments	No reliance on external authority or tradition
Mutual respect	Unilateral obedience	Cooperation among equals
Reversibility	Views the dilemma from only one point of view	Understanding of the other's perspective; reciprocity
Constructivism	Rigid view of rules and laws as fixed	Flexible view of rules and laws as adaptable
Choice	Does not choose or justify choice in terms of fairness or justice	Chooses solution generally seen as just or fair

Source: Logan, Snarey & Schrader (1990), p. 75.

In sum, Kohlberg's type categories expanded his stage theory in three respects: (1) moral types primarily address the content of moral reasoning, whereas moral stages focus on the structure of moral reasoning; (2) either type may occur at any stage and at any age in the lifespan, thus accounting for observed within-stage variability (cf. Schraeder et al., 1987); and (3) moral type helps clarify the connection between moral reasoning and moral action.

### *Moral Atmosphere*

Kohlberg (1980, 1985) and colleagues (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989) developed the concept of "moral atmosphere" to refer to a community's shared expectations and normative values. He also referred to the concept as a community's "moral climate" or "moral culture." Kohlberg understood that the group is the primary context for the development of a moral person. At the time when this concept was being developed, his stage theory was being criticized for his emphasis on the individual reasoner and on individual rights, at the expense of the community (cf. Snarey & Keljo, 1991).

Kohlberg's theory of moral atmosphere analysis is a robust answer to his communitarian and Durkheimian critics. Based in part on Durkheim's idea that the group is greater than the sum of its individual members, Kohlberg and his colleagues sought to characterize the added value of groups that would be the most relevant to moral cognition, development, and behavior. Also, drawing on Durkheim's view that the unit of education was the group, Kohlberg concluded that changing the school's moral culture would profoundly affect an individual's moral formation. Kohlberg further specified that the most beneficial group for moral development is a democratically governed group, one that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of each to each other and to the group as a whole. Thus, a simple focus on the developmental promotion of an individual's moral reasoning was not enough; democratic governance would be the kind of collective socialization that would foster moral ideals, goals, and actions as well as promote moral reasoning. In addition, the promotion of moral development had to include the collective socialization of moral content. Kohlberg (1985) came to emphasize that moral development is not only about doing justice; it also includes the social dimension of a person acting in caring relationships with those attached to each other and with the group (cf. McDonough, 2005).

Clark Power and Ann Higgins worked with Kohlberg (1989) to construct an array of complex variables that, taken together, provide a detailed map of a school's moral atmosphere or climate. Three of these variables (levels of institutional valuing, stages of community valuing, and phases of the collective norm) are summarized in Table 5.3. The first two focus on the valuing of the school as a social entity, and the last one focuses on the phases of commitment to the collective norm.

Kohlberg and his colleagues noted that "the two major units in this analysis, the collective norm and the element of institutional value, correspond to two of Durkheim's goals of moral education: discipline and attachment to the group." They continued: "Durkheim's third goal of moral education, autonomy, corresponds most closely to our analysis of the stage of norms and elements" (p. 116). As Kohlberg (1985) states elsewhere, they made use of Durkheim's concept of the "spirit of discipline" as "respect for group norms and rules" and "respect for the group; which makes them" (p. 42), and they made use of his concept of the "spirit of altruism," which arises from attachment to the group, as "the willingness to freely give up the ego's interests, privileges and possessions

**Table 5.3** Moral Atmosphere: Levels, Stages, and Phases

<i>Levels of Institutional Valuing</i>	<i>Stages of Community Valuing</i>	<i>Phases of the Collective Norm</i>
<p>Level 0: Rejection The school is not valued.</p> <p>Level 1: Instrumental extrinsic valuing The school is valued as an institution that helps individuals to meet their own needs.</p> <p>Level 2: Enthusiastic identification The school is valued at special moments when members feel an intense sense of identification with the school.</p> <p>Level 3: Spontaneous community The school is valued as the kind of place in which members feel a sense of closeness to others and an inner motivation to help them and to serve the community as a whole.</p> <p>Level 4: Normative community The school as a community is valued for its own sake. Community can obligate its members in special ways, and members can expect others to uphold group norms and responsibilities.</p>	<p>Stage 2: There is no clear sense of community apart from exchanges among group members. Community denotes a collection of individuals who do favors for each other and rely on each other for protection. Community is valued insofar as it meets the concrete needs of its members.</p> <p>Stage 3: The sense of community refers to a set of relationships and sharing among group members. The group is valued for the friendliness of its members. The value of the group is equated with the value of its collective normative expectations.</p> <p>Stage 4: The community is explicitly valued as an entity distinct from the relationships among its members. Community membership is understood in terms of entering into a social contract to respect the norms and ideals of the group. The community is perceived as an organic whole composed of interrelated systems that carry on the functioning of the group.</p>	<p>Phase 0: No collective norm exists or is proposed.</p> <p><i>Collective Norm Proposal</i> Phase 1: Individuals propose collective norms for group acceptance.</p> <p><i>Collective Norm Acceptance</i> Phase 2: Collective norm is accepted as a group ideal but not agreed to. It is not an expectation for behavior.</p> <p>Phase 3: Collective norm is accepted and agreed to, but it is not (yet) an expectation for behavior.</p> <p><i>Collective Norm Expectation</i> Phase 4: Collective norm is accepted and expected (naive expectation).</p> <p>Phase 5: Collective norm is expected but not followed (disappointed expectation).</p> <p><i>Collective Norm Enforcement</i> Phase 6: Collective norm is expected and upheld through persuasion.</p> <p>Phase 7: Collective norm is expected and upheld through reporting.</p>

Source: Adapted from Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg (1989), pp. 117, 119, 130.

Note

The parallel listing of the three variables is not intended to imply a clear theoretical parallelism between moral atmosphere levels, stages, and phases.

to the group or other members of it” (p. 42). Going beyond Durkheim, however, Kohlberg and colleagues also placed more emphasis on rational “autonomy” to avoid abuses that could result from “immoral use” of the power of the “collectivist model” (1987, p. 116). Furthermore, Kohlberg (1985) supplemented Durkheim’s concept of “loyalty” to one’s society with “loyalty to universal principles of justice and responsibility as the solution to problems” (p. 41).

The net effect of this work was to broaden Kohlberg’s theory to include the concurrent processes of moral judgment development and cultural values socialization, without reducing one to the other. Subsequent empirical research has provided support for the wisdom of this approach (cf. Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999). Within this developmental-socialization approach to morality, Kohlberg employed three distinct pedagogical methods.

### KOHLBERG’S THREE METHODS OF MORAL EDUCATION

The center of Kohlberg’s identity was that of a moral educator. Kohlberg (1987) understood that what promoted a person’s structural changes in moral reasoning was having rich experiences in the social-moral realm. Kohlberg’s pedagogical methods of moral education promote learning from interaction with adult role models (moral exemplars), peers and friends (dilemma discussions), and the larger school community (Just Community schools).

#### *Moral Exemplars*

The least acknowledged of Kohlberg’s methods of moral education is his use of moral exemplars to pedagogically support socialization and promote development. He intuitively understood that observing or learning about those who practiced moral principles was a more direct method of teaching than any theory could hope to attain. Kohlberg often demonstrated stage-level reasoning with concrete examples from moral judgment interviews, thus using moral case examples to teach his moral developmental categories. For advanced stages, he used public moral exemplars to embody the uncommon Stage 5 and the mercurial Stage 6. Kohlberg also saw public moral exemplars as a critical factor in public moral education; through their insights and actions, they “draw” our development toward higher stages of moral reasoning. Kohlberg held up such mature examples as moral exemplars.

In *Essays on Moral Development: The Psychology of Moral Development* (1984, pp. 486–490), Kohlberg and chapter co-author Ann Higgins offered a 32-year-old woman named “Joan” as a moral exemplar. Joan’s ability to frame the Heinz dilemma as a dialogue of competing claims and her ability to take the role of each person in the dilemma, in turn, appeared to be an example of post-conventional moral reasoning. This was confirmed for Kohlberg by Joan’s life story. Joan worked with juvenile wards of the court for a local judge and allowed one of the wards in her care to escape to a better situation in a halfway house in another state, even to the point of providing her with bus money. This action was a clear violation of her responsibilities as outlined by the law, and Joan lost her job. Joan’s words and actions suggest a form of reasoning that posits a universal respect for the rights and dignity of persons regardless of the dictates of the law.

Going beyond the individual case study, Kohlberg often used a “roll call of the saints” rhetorical device to list the names of those whom he saw as moral exemplars. Limiting

our survey to his two-volume collected works on moral philosophy (1981) and moral psychology (1984), there are six separate such lists with a total of nine moral exemplars. Two persons are included in five of his six lists and were otherwise also cited the most frequently in his writings: Martin Luther King, Jr., and Socrates. One person was included in two of the lists: Abraham Lincoln. The remaining six were included in one of the six lists: Roman humanitarian Marcus Aurelius, pediatrician and Nazi resister Janusz Korczak, Lord Chancellor Thomas More, Quaker mental health worker Andrea Simpson, stoic philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and non-violent civil disobedience advocate Henry David Thoreau. Occasionally, Kohlberg spoke of at least three other individuals in such a way as to suggest membership in his pantheon of moral exemplars: “Joan,” Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, and Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox.

What made these dozen people worthy of being included in Kohlberg’s roll call of moral exemplars and as valuable models for moral educators today? Perhaps most important, in addition to their exemplary moral reasoning and empathic moral emotions, they had taken action to rectify an injustice (e.g., non-violent public dissent, critical speeches, protest marches). These were acts of public moral education. Morality, without works, is dead, Kohlberg seemed to believe. Thus, while Kohlberg admired many philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, Plato, Kant, John Dewey, John Rawls), the only one he elevated to moral sainthood was Socrates. Although he bestows respectful admiration on several theologians (Paul Tillich, Martin Luther King, Jr., Teilhard de Chardin) and four Saints of the Catholic Church (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas More, Saint Paul), Kohlberg only spoke of two of these seven as moral exemplars: Thomas More and Martin Luther King, Jr. While discussing the relation between morality, religion, and a hypothetical Stage 7, Kohlberg acknowledged the work of several well-known and charismatic religious leaders, but he only elevated Spinoza, Marcus Aurelius, Andrea Simpson, and Martin Luther King, Jr. as faith-motivated moral exemplars, which suggests that his positive regard for them had little to do with religious charisma and everything to do with how they lived out their moral principles (cf. Hart & Atkins, 2004).

Finally, Kohlberg always understood that moral exemplars were still flawed human beings and products of their time. For example, one of the central undertakings for many of his exemplars was *moral education against racism* (e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, Jr., Janusz Korczak). Nevertheless, while discussing the Piaget-like phenomena of historical “decalage” on the subject of enlightenment regarding slavery, Kohlberg notes that “Socrates was more accepting of slavery than was Lincoln, who was more accepting of it than King,” who was not accepting of it at all (1981, p. 129). Inevitably, of course, a similar historical partiality was engendered in Kohlberg as a product of his own times. In terms of race and gender, his roll call of exemplars included one black man, two white women, and nine white men. Nevertheless, although he exhibited partiality, his primary criteria for being considered an exemplar for moral education rings true because they lived out their mature moral reasoning and empathy through moral behavior and courageous action that threatened the status quo. Consequently, most faced penalties and some died for their moral stance.

Experienced moral educators know that lecture descriptions of moral stages take on new relevance when illustrated with examples “ripped from the headlines,” so to speak, or when a moral exemplar makes a guest visit to a class session to talk about why they care (cf. Vozzola, 1996). Publications on moral exemplars also can be useful in moral education. Colby and Damon (1992) provide portraits of 23 contemporary lives of moral

commitment and courageous leadership. Siddle-Walker and Snarey (2004) make use of six moral exemplars, three children and three adults, who embody African-American care-and-justice ethics.

### *Dilemma Discussions*

About a decade after Kohlberg (1958) proposed his moral stage model, the first genuine Kohlbergian venture into moral education began with an experiment by Kohlberg's doctoral student, Moshe Blatt, who attempted to facilitate moral stage development among sixth-grade students through weekly classroom discussions of hypothetical moral dilemmas (cf. Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). Blatt found that over one-third of the students in the experimental group advanced in stage of moral development during the year, whereas few of the students in a control group exhibited any stage change.

Subsequently, Kohlberg and his colleagues implemented this method by integrating dilemma discussions into the curriculum of school classes on the humanities (e.g., literature) and social studies (e.g., history). To prepare teachers, Kohlberg and colleagues held workshops and wrote about how to lead moral dilemma discussions (e.g., Fenton & Kohlberg, 1976; Kohlberg & Lickona, 1987). Some of the questions were quite similar to those used in a standard moral judgment interview; that is, they asked students to clarify their reasoning about "why" they held a certain position. Other questions asked students to make their meaning clear, ensure a shared understanding, or promote peer interaction, especially perspective-taking (cf. Selman, 1971). Additionally, attention was given to questions designed to promote Socratic discussion. Fritz Oser (1992) advanced a more group-centered method of "discourse ethics" and Georg Lind (2007) attended to the importance of the overall structure and organization of a moral dilemma discussion.

The major assumption of promoting moral dilemma discussions in classrooms and peer groups is that "interactive exchanges with peers" will "speed up the natural development of moral judgment" (Rest & Thoma, 1986, p. 59). Samuelson (2007), for instance, demonstrated that a discussion-based curriculum using film clips containing moral dilemmas from popular Hollywood films produced a statistically significant improvement in the degree to which students endorsed higher stage moral reasoning compared to those who did not participate. Beyond statistical significance, however, Kohlberg asked, how psychologically significant are the gains promoted by participation in dilemma discussions? Subsequent comparison studies of approaches to moral education, and several reviews of moral education research and programs using moral dilemmas, have provided decisive evaluations.

The landmark meta-analysis of 55 studies by Schlaefli, Rest, and Thoma (1985) showed that the dilemma discussion approach produces moderate and significant educational effects on moral development, whereas other types of intervention programs produce smaller effects, and individual academic courses in the humanities produce even weaker effects. Higgins' review (1980) drew similar but more qualitative conclusions.

The most powerful interventions for stimulating moral stage change are those that involve discussions of real [rather than hypothetical] problems and situations occurring in natural groups, whether the family or classroom in which all participants are empowered to have a say in the discussion.

This finding should alert teachers and professors that many unexpected critical incidents in teaching involve a real moral dilemma and often provide an opportunity to engage in a real-life moral dilemma discussion.

Dilemma discussions are also used in formal courses on ethics. DeHaan and colleagues (1997) compared the effectiveness of three approaches to ethics education among high school students by enrolling students in one of four high school classes: an introductory ethics class, a blended economics-ethics class, a role-model ethics class taught by graduate students, and a non-ethics comparison class. The first two classes used dilemma discussions, and all groups were assessed with pre- and post-test measures of moral reasoning, moral emotions, and moral behavior. The clearest positive pattern evident in the data was that the integrated economics-ethics class and the introductory ethics class showed statistically significant gains in socio-moral reflection maturity, principled moral reasoning, and moral behavior. Similar students in the comparison group and the role-model ethics class showed no such advances. These findings again suggest that high school students have the most to gain when teachers explicitly draw their students' attention to the ethical issues inherent in their respective courses and integrate the discussion of relevant moral dilemmas into their current courses.

It is not just the method or experience of moral dilemma discussion that has an impact on its efficacy in moral development, but also the peer context. Kohlberg hypothesized that the ideal situation for advancement in moral reasoning was to be involved in a discussion with another person who reasoned at a level one stage higher (+1) than one's own level. Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) engaged a group whose participants expressed reasoning at various levels in a dilemma discussion. The experimenter then chose the argument that was one stage above the level of most of the participants and supported it, emphasizing its strengths and encouraging participants to engage in thinking along these lines. This method led to significant increases in moral maturity scores. In a review of the effectiveness of moral development interventions using the plus-one strategy with moral dilemma discussions, Enright, Lapsley, Harris, and Schawver (2001) established that most (10 of 13 interventions) produced significant gains in moral reasoning. Those interventions in which a significant difference did not occur tended to be of shorter duration (e.g., one to six sessions). Although the plus-one strategy has good support in the literature, other strategies have also proven effective. Walker's (1982) study of middle school students found a significant effect on moral reasoning with exposure to persons who reasoned two stages above the subjects, whereas Berkowitz, Gibbs, and Broughton's (1980) study of college students found the ideal stage differential was at a third (+1/3) of a stage for dialogues between two peers. Overall, these studies support the general concept of the "zone of proximal development" that posits that children learn best from a person who performs at one level just above the child's level (Walker & Taylor, 1991).

Although most studies of moral development interventions take place in the school setting, much of a child's moral development takes place at home. Walker and Taylor (1991) investigated the role of dilemma discussions between parent and child. They showed that children with significant gains in moral reasoning over time had parents that adjusted their level of moral reasoning to fit the child's. In other words, it is not high moral reasoning in parents that predicts change in the child; rather it is parents who can accommodate their reasoning to the child's level who will have the most effect. They also found that hypothetical dilemmas were not predictive of children's subsequent moral development, but that "real-life" moral dilemmas from the experience of the child had



the greatest impact, supporting Higgins' (1980) prior conclusion. Moreover, Walker and Taylor found that the most effective type of communication in moral dilemma discussions was representational, which included such behaviors as restating the child's reasoning, asking for the child's opinion, asking questions of clarification, and checking for understanding. This, combined with presentation of moral reasoning at approximately one stage above the child's pre-intervention stage score, predicted the greatest gains in the child's moral reasoning.

Ann Kruger (1992, 1993), like Piaget, reasoned that the greater symmetry of knowledge and power in the peer dyads compared to the adult/child dyads produced the freedom to entertain multiple perspectives, which resulted in measurable development in moral reasoning. Kruger's (1992) investigation of moral dilemmas included young girls' discussions both with their peers and with their mothers. She showed that peer discussions of moral dilemmas result in greater improvement in moral reasoning than do discussions between children and adults.

From these studies we can draw several conclusions:

1. Dilemma discussion is a useful method for moral development education.
2. Real-life dilemmas, perhaps especially those drawn from personal experience, are more efficacious for moral development than are hypothetical dilemmas.
3. There is a zone of proximal development in which dilemma discussions will most advance moral development.
4. Peers are the best teachers or conversation partners. Dilemma or problem-situation based discussions continue to be the most widely used method of moral education today.

### *Just Community Schools*

In 1973, Kohlberg's thinking about moral education within schools broke new ground when he recognized a limitation of the moral dilemma discussion method. Although it can change students (slowly), it does not take into account the moral atmosphere of the social context. As Kohlberg put it, the school is a context "in which one cannot wait until children reach [Stage 5 of moral development] to deal directly with moral behavior" (1978, p. 15). However, Kohlberg now faced a pedagogical dilemma: how to teach moral values without imposing them on children or compromising their moral autonomy. In addition, because children often reason within one stage of each other and their interaction provides optimal opportunities to advance moral reasoning, the dilemma then becomes how to help children teach each other universal moral values.

Kohlberg had theorized that this dilemma was solvable because the end principles found in higher stages (4, 5, and 6) of reasoning, such as reciprocity, respect, and justice, were present in some elementary form from Stage 1 onwards (Kohlberg, 1980). His plan for developing children's moral maturity was for the teacher to promote the development of the children's native sense of fairness and, in so doing, prepare them to better understand and then appropriate the principle of justice toward which moral development reaches. The goal was to achieve a "balance [of] 'justice' and 'community'; to introduce the powerful appeal of the collective while both protecting the rights of individual students and promoting their moral growth" (Power et al., 1989, p. 53). His bold and daring approach was deceptively simple—a return to the progressive ideal of educational democracy but within a communitarian mode (cf. Dewey, 1916).

Kohlberg founded the first Just Community school in the spring of 1974. He had received funding to train high school teachers in developmental moral education. At the same time in the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, plans for a new alternative high school were under way and Kohlberg was invited to consult in its planning. Students, parents, teachers, and Kohlberg met together to design the new school. The end result was the Cluster School, which was governed by the following principles:

1. The school would be governed by direct democracy. All major issues would be discussed and decided at a weekly community meeting at which all members (students and teachers) would have one vote.
2. There would be, in addition, a number of standing committees to be filled by students, teachers, and parents.
3. A social contract would be drawn between members which would define everyone's rights and responsibilities.
4. Students and teachers would have the same basic rights, including freedom of expression, respect of others, and freedom from physical or verbal harm.

The keystone of the Just Community approach was the weekly community meeting (aka, Town Meeting), a gathering of students and staff to decide school policies and practices that dealt with issues of fairness and community. The advisor and standing committee groups met on the day before the community meeting. Each advisory group consisted of one of the five teachers and a fifth of the students. These small group meetings set the stage for the larger community meetings as well as provided an opportunity for students and their advisors to get to know each other and share more personal concerns than could be dealt with in the larger meeting. The agenda for the community meeting would be discussed, and the small group would often debate the issues and try to achieve consensus or agreement on majority and minority proposals to bring to the next day's meeting.

All of these meetings functioned as a context for moral discussion and a place to build community. The general aim was for students to achieve a sense of community solidarity—to create a “moral atmosphere”—through the practice of democratic governance (i.e., coming to fair decisions, carrying out these decisions, and, as necessary, to democratically changing their decisions). One aspect of the Just Community educator's role was similar to that of a youth leader, that is, to function both as a socializer, in the manner of Durkheim, and as a facilitator, in the manner of Piaget. The sense of group solidarity allowed the peer group to function as a moral authority for its members' behavior. Direct participatory democracy, furthermore, functions to protect the rights of the student and to limit the power of group solidarity to coerce conformity, in order to maintain the possibility for alternative conceptions of the good to be voiced.

The role of the teacher was perhaps as important as the students' peers. In typical moral dilemma discussions in a regular classroom, teachers primarily functioned as facilitators, but in the new Just Community schools, teachers also had to function as advocates for moral content: justice and community values (Kohlberg & Selman, 1972; Selman, 2003). Thus, the teachers served as moral leaders by advocating their own positions within the constraints of one person, one vote, and by being invested in “what” students decided to do and “why” they decided to do it (Oser & Renold, 2006).

Later Kohlberg and his colleagues applied the Just Community approach at the suburban Scarsdale Alternative High School in Westchester County, New York, an upper- and upper-middle-class school and at the Brookline High School, Brookline, Massachusetts, a semi-urban middle-class school-within-a-school (cf. Mosher, Kenny, & Garrod, 1994). Finally, toward the end of his life, Kohlberg and his colleagues implemented three Just Community programs in New York City; two in one of the five worst city schools and one in an examination school with high-performing students (see Higgins, 1989). Several other schools have adopted the principles of Just Community schools, at least in part, in order to promote moral development (see Howard-Hamilton, 1995).

Reactions to the idea of “the adolescent as citizen” often create the same initial response as the idea of “the child as philosopher.” What “kind of quixotic oxymoron” is this? (Mosher, 1992, p. 179). Educational researchers also have asked; does Kohlberg's Just Community approach actually promote the moral reasoning of students and the moral atmosphere of schools? The answer is a qualified “yes,” based on a comparative analysis of the first three Just Community schools (cf. Mosher et al., 1994; Power et al., 1989). The students in each of the three Just Community schools (i.e., Cambridge, Brookline, and Scarsdale) scored significantly higher than their contemporaries attending the parallel or parent high schools on all measures of moral atmosphere, including the level of institutional valuing, stage of community valuing, and phase of collective norm. The results on individual moral judgment were also in the expected direction; the average moral stage scores for the students in the Just Community programs were significantly higher than for the students in their companion traditional high schools. The stage gains were smaller than expected, but still respectable (i.e., at two- and three-year longitudinal follow-up interviews, students at the Cluster School showed that they gained, on average, about a half-stage in moral development). It is also noteworthy that the evaluation studies found no statistically significant gender differences in any of the analyses of moral culture or moral stage variables. Nevertheless, it also is clear that future Just Community interventions need to provide for a greater degree of culturally sensitive adaptation and cultural responsiveness when approaching cross-class, cross-race, or cross-cultural school settings, each with its own distinctive sociocultural history, strengths, and needs (cf. Nucci, 2001; Vozzola & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2000). At the minimum, as Noddings (1992) has noted, “we respond most effectively [as caring persons] when we understand the other's needs and the history of this need” (p. 23).

In sum, the net effect of the Just Community model of moral education was to extend Kohlberg's theory from the moral reasoning of individuals to the moral culture of communities (cf. Oser, Althof, & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2008). Kohlberg's Just Community approach to moral education incorporates both socialization and developmental perspectives and provides a way for teachers and administrators to embody justice and care in their treatment of students and each other and a way for students to develop these moral values. In the end, the Just Community approach also expanded our understanding of conventional moral reasoning (stages 3 and 4). Students reasoning at so-called conformist levels were shown to be able to “understand moral concepts” in ways that allow them to “scrutinize, critique, resist, or attempt to change the practices, laws, or arrangements of their” high school society (Turiel, 2002, p. 105).

## WHAT KOHLBERG TAUGHT US

Kohlberg opened the eyes of psychologists and educators to the fact that people's moral thinking changes as they mature, and that these changes follow predictable stages of development as they grow older. While his stage model is one of his greatest contributions to moral psychology, Kohlberg also contributed models of moral types, as well as moral cultural atmosphere levels, which have made the picture of human moral development more complete. Kohlberg's models of moral development, alone, would have been a remarkable achievement. But he was, at heart, a dedicated educator, committed to seeing theory bear fruit, and so he developed methods of moral education that would promote moral development and mature character. Kohlberg's three-pronged approach to moral education—moral exemplars, moral dilemma discussions, and Just Community schools—collectively transcend the dichotomy of socialization versus development. His groundbreaking approach to moral education, similarly, taught that we must pay equal and concurrent attention to the moral reasoning development of the individual and the moral cultural development of the community. Both play equally important roles in the development of morality.

Additionally, Kohlberg demonstrated a genuine interest in views of his critics and a willingness to engage new approaches to moral cognition, development, and education. His example remains especially relevant today because the cognitive-developmental tradition is currently characterized by a spirit of revisionism. This pluralism is to be valued because we now understand that “moral functioning is inherently multifaceted” (Walker, 2004, p. 547). Taking our cue from Kohlberg's openness, it is likely that we have much to gain from positive engagement with ongoing constructive critiques of the cognitive-developmental tradition. Many of the critics began their theoretical work during Kohlberg's lifetime (1927–1987) but, during the post-Kohlberg decades, theoretical innovations accelerated, alternative measures of theoretical constructs were perfected, and corresponding methods of moral education have been constructed (cf. Arnold, 2000). A number of these alternatives and innovations are reflected in the chapters in this handbook. These innovations demonstrate the field's current spirit of expansion and pluralistic revisionism. Kohlberg would be the first to remind us, of course, that there is room at the table for everyone.

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